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RECLAIMING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL "OTHER": 
NARRATIVE AND THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF IDENTITY 
"A Word on Categories" 
As I write, my editor a t  Harvard University Press is waging something 
of a struggle with the people a t  the Library of Congress about how this book is 
to be categorized for cataloging purposes. The librarians think "Afro- 
Americans--Civil Rights" and "Law Teachers" would be nice. I told my editor 
to hold out for "Autobiography," "Fiction," "Gender Studies," and "Medieval 
Medicine." This battle seems appropriate enough since the book is not 
exclusively about race or law but also about boundary. While being black has 
been the powerful social attribution in my life, it is only one of a number of 
governing narratives or presiding fictions by which I am constantly reconfiguring 
myself in the world. Gender is another, along with ecology, pacifism, my 
peculiar brand of colloquial English, and Roxbury, Massachusetts. The 
complexity of role identification, the politics of sexuality, the inflections of 
professionalized discourse--all describe and impose boundary in my life, even as  
they confound one another in unfolding spirals of confrontation, deflection, and 
dream ... 
The Alchemv of Race and Rights: the Diarv of a Law Professor (Williams 
1991, pp. 256-57) 
(italics ours). 
INTRODUCTION 
Every knowledge discipline needs a n  "epistemological other" to consolidate a 
cohesive self-identity and collective pr0ject.l For the social sciences, the concept of 
narrative-with its long association with the  humanities and the historical profession- 
-holds pride of place in filling t ha t  role. Variously formulated in binary terms as 
"idiographic" versus "nomothetic," "particularistic" versus "generalizable," or 
"description1' versus "theory," the contrast between the "mere narrative" approach of 
the historians and the more rigorous methodologies of the social sciences has 
effectively cordoned off narrative studies from the legitimate "identity-terrain" of 
social science epistemology.2 But a small revolution with potentially large 
consequences is occurring in our contemporary knowledge ~ u l t u r e . ~  Over the last  few 
decades many historians have lost, abandoned, and even scorned narrative 
e ~ ~ l a n a t i o n . ~  At  the same time, moreover, a protean reframing of the narrative 
concept is seeping andlor being appropriated into the central epistemological 
frameworks of a spectrum of other disciplines--including medicine, social psychology, 
anthropology, gender studies, law, biology, and  physics. 
8' 
The expressions of this narrative reframing are broad and diverse. One aspect 
of many of the new works in narrative studies, however, is especially relevant to our 
understanding of how identities are constituted, namely the shift from a focus on 
representational to ontological narrativity. Philosophers of history, for example, have 
previously argued t h a t  narrative modes of representing knowledge (telling historical 
stories) were representational forms imposed by historians on the chaos of lived 
experience (Mink 1966; White 1984). More recently, however, scholars (political 
philosophers, psychologists, legal theorists, feminist theorists, social workers, 
organizational theorists, anthropologists, and medical sociologists) are postulating 
something much more substantive about narrative: namely, t h a t  social life is itself 
storied and t ha t  narrative is a n  ontological condition of  social life. Their research is 
showing us  t ha t  stories guide action; t ha t  people construct identities (however 
multiple and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of 
emplotted stories; t ha t  "experience" is constituted through narratives; t ha t  people 
make sense of what has  happened and is happening to them by attempting to 
assemble or in  some way to integrate these happenings within one or more 
narratives; and t ha t  people are guided to act in  certain ways, and not others, on the 
basis of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiplicity but  
ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public, and cultural  narrative^.^ 
But there is a paradox. On the one hand, sociologists have by and large kept 
their distance from these studies of ontological narrativity.6 Yet on the other hand, 
sociology has  shown a n  immense interest in theorizing about the very themes these 
new approaches to narrative are addressing--the study of meaning, social action, 
social agency, and most recently, collective identity. Indeed the last two decades have 
been notable for the number of heroic efforts by sociologists to recast' social analysis 
along the central axes of the interaction between agency and structure--that is, to 
develop a social theory that allows for human action which is nonetheless bounded 
and constrained by structural restraints (e.g. Abrams 1982; Alexander 1982, 1988a, 
1989; Bourdieu 1977, 1990; Coleman 1990; Giddens 1977, 1985; Habermas 1979, 
1984; Hawthorne 1976; Sewell 1986; Smith 1987, 1990a, 1990b; White 1992b17. 
There are perhaps two reasons for this paradoxical distancing from the new 
narrative studies on the part of sociologists. The first is that social scientists 
overwhelmingly limit their definition of the term narrative to that of a 
representational formlmethod of presenting social and historical knowledge. And i t  is 
in this very methodological terrain, where the debate over what counts as valid 
explanation has raged, that  social scientists have forged their unique identity and 
, distinction from the humanities. As long as  this representational definition prevails, 
then, social scientists--in order to be social scientists--must continue to view 
narrative as the epistemological other and in symbolic contrast to causal 
explanation. Indeed to the extent sociologists have engaged with narrative studies, 
the dialogue often recreates the familiar Manichean dichotomy between social science 
explanation and the narrative other. Whether in favor or disparagement, the 
encounters between sociology and narrative analysis seem inevitably to result in 
-". . - counterposing narrative to that  of causality. Seidman (1991), for example, recently 
-.,.-. ... . criticized the "foundational obsessionalism" of mainstream sociological theory while 
demonstrating his support for an  understanding of social theory as "narrative with a 
moral intent." Seidman is a sociologist who strongly endorses the turn to narrative. 
Nonetheless, in his association of narrative with "story-telling particularism," he 
straps i t  into an unnecessary opposition to, and ultimately distancing from, the 
social sciences. 8 
The second reason for the neglect of the recently reframed narrativism follows 
directly from the self-identity project of the social sciences. From their inception, the 
social sciences have been concerned with what one political scientist calls the 
"primacy of epistemology" (Connolly 1991b), or the eclipsing of discovery and 
ontology by the context of justification (Somers 1989, forthcoming bh9 The latter is 
comprised of the standards we use to know about the world, the grounds we rely upon 
to legitimate these foundations of knowledge, the validity of competing methodologies, 
and the criteria for viable explanations. Discovery and ontology, on the other hand, 
refer to problem-formation and social being respectively. Both are seen as better left 
to speculative philosophers or psychologists. The consequences of this division of 
labor for a sociology of action are significant: 1) Issues of social being, identity, and 
ontology are  excluded from the legitimate mainstream of sociological investigation; 
and 2) the social sciences focus their research on action and agency by studying 
primarily observable social behavior--measured variously by social interests, rational 
preferences, or social norms and values--rather than  by exploring expressions of 
social being and identity. Therefore, precisely to the extent t ha t  sociologists are  
aware t ha t  the recent focus of narrative studies is towards issues of identity and 
ontology, these same studies are defined as beyond and outside the boundaries of 
appropriate social science concern. 10 
We argue in  this chapter t ha t  the association of identity and ontology with 
philosophy or theoretical psychology on the one side, and action with interests, 
norms, or behavior on the  other, is a limited model and deprives sociologists of the 
deeper analysis t ha t  is possible to achieve by linking the concepts of action and 
identity. To get these benefits, however, we must reject the decoupling of action from 
ontology, and instead accept t ha t  some notion of social being and social identity is, 
willy-nilly, incorporated into each and every knowledge-statement about action, 
agency, and behavior. J u s t  as sociologists are not likely to make sense of action 
without focusing attention on structure and order, it is unlikely we can interpret 
social action if we fail to also emphasize ontology, social being, and identity. l l We 
thus  enlarge our analytic focus when we study social action through a lens t ha t  also 
allows a focus on social ontology and the social constitution of identity. l2 
Once we have acknowledged the potential significance of identity, however, we 
must  reject the temptation to conflate identities with what can often slide into fixed 
"essentialist" (pre-political) singular categories, such as  those of race, sex, or gender-- 
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a tendency which has  characterized a number of recent feminist theories in their 
efforts to restore the previously marginalized female "other. " l Anthropological 
studies of different cultures have often been used to avoid this danger (Carrithers et. 
al,  Mauss 1985; Dumont 1982). But, a s  Williams (1991, p. 256) illustrates in  the 
quotation with which we begin this chapter, we do not have to resort to cultural 
"others" to recognize the false certainties imposed by categorical approaches to 
identity. We can avoid this danger only if we incorporate into the core conception of 
identity the dimensions of time, space, and relationality. And it is this enlargement 
t h a t  drives us  to combine studies of action and identity with what we will be calling 
conceptual narrativity. 
Once we have linked identity and action research to narrative analysis, 
Y:-~ . however, we need to remember to focus our attention on the new ontological 
dimension of narrative studies rather than  be satisfied with the traditional rendering 
of narrative a s  limited to a method or form of representation. The reason why is 
straightforward. While sociologists worry endlessly over the (unresolvable?) 
i. 
questions of what counts as valid knowledge (should it be pure "science" or 
- .  "narrative with a moral intent?"), we are  meanwhile being distracted from the 
exciting new developments in which researchers outside of sociology are  coming to 
grips with a new, historically and empirically based, narrativist understanding of 
social action and social agency--one t ha t  is temporal, relational, and cultural, a s  well 
as institutional, material, and macro-structural. Engaging with this aspect of 
narrative studies clearly should be on the agenda for sociological studies of action 
and agency. After all, if research results are  correct, then everything we know from 
making families, to coping with illness, to carrying out strikes and revolutions are at 
least in pa r t  a result of numerous cross-cutting story-lines in which social actors 
locate themselves (Somers 1986, 1992). 
An energetic engagement with this new ontological narrativity, then, provides 
a n  opportunity to connect the long-term interest in  a sociology of action with studies 
of identity-formation. The hope is tha t  bringing together narrative and identity can 
bring a new perspective to some of the seemingly intractable problems contained in 
social theories of action. For t ha t  'reason we begin (Part  I) by exploring the issues 
and the recursive fault-lines surrounding the sociology of action; Par t  I1 addresses 
the new sociology and politics of identity as a n  important development in  the study of 
agency and structure; and Par t  I11 discusses in more detail the reframed concept of 
narrative. In Par t  IV we introduce the concepts of narrative identity and relational 
setting as  conceptual links between the reframed approach to narrative and some of 
the enduring conundrums in the sociology of action. We end with Par t  V which 
considers the research implications of a conceptual narrativity. 
I: THE PROBLEM OF ACTION IN SOCIAL THEORY 
The problems in  the sociology of action are  rooted in the development, course, 
and consequences of the original eighteenth-century social science project--a project 
which fused together a revolutionary epistemology with a nineteenth-century 
rendering of historical change to create the great metanarrative of classical 
modernization. Let us start with the epistemology.14 
Like the naturalistic fable tha t  inaugurated its birth, the logic of modern 
social science has  elements of the incoherent. Both were built of utopian fictions 
about society's emancipation from history. In the 1750s William Townsend, the late 
eighteenth- century English statesman, wrote a social parable about the isle of J u a n  
Fernandez. The island (it had been made famous in England by the mythical 
Robinson Crusoe) was populated only by goats and dogs (men and women). 
According to reigning Hobbesian assumptions, these allegorical people should have 
had brutish, nasty, and very short lives in the absence of institutional authority. 
Townsend, however, endowed the island with a perfect harmony through a natura l  
balance of population and food. He did not explain this by what we might today 
identify as a n  Orwellian allegory in which order is maintained through 
\ 
bureaucratization or political tyranny. Rather the fable's utopianism was precisely 
in its inverse postulate: No state or artificial law was necessary to maintain the 
equilibrium. This mini-society flourished precisely because it was left to its natural  
laws--freed from what he viewed a s  the chains of state politics, kinship, religion, and 
"traditional" cultural institutions. Townsend built his case by borrowing a 
revolutionary new metaphysics--the laws of nature--from a revolutionary new 
epistemology--that of natural  science. He combined these into a new science of 
society to conceptually liberate the social world from political or social authority and 
the claim's of its most articulate apologists, Hobbesian and Lockean political theory. 
Classical social science was born of this revolutionary epistemology constructed upon . 
a myth and a metaphor about a unified social system whose parts  expressed a n  inner 
working autonomous logic. Social thinkers of the late eighteenth century 
appropriated Townsend's anti-institutional naturalism--the optimistic belief t ha t  
politics, philosophy, and symbolic meaning had been surpassed by the laws of nature 
and society--as the core metaphor of a new science of society. Prevailing Hobbesian 
assumptions thus yielded to a social utopianism and radical naturalism: for Hobbes, 
society needed a state because human were like beasts; for Townsend, it seems t ha t  
natural  law sufficed because humans were beasts. Liberated from the burdensome 
traditions of the past--elegant in its parsimonious simplicity--the revolutionary 
science o f  society had arrived. l 
Complexity, however, made trouble in Eden. A great sociological conundrum 
was to sprout from this naturalistic fantasia: How to make coherent the  meaning of 
human agency? The detachment of social science from the sphere of moral and 
political philosophy in  favor of the scientific study of society and culture starkly 
posed the critical problem of whether this systemic notion of society be reconciled 
with a n  intelligible--that is to say, meaningful--understanding of human action? 
Could a naturalistic law-like representation of society be reconciled with a n  ontology 
which still accommodated moral agency rather than  mere behaviorism, individualism 
as  well a s  social holism? Simply put, could there any longer be a place for the beliefs 
and actions of social actors other than  as mere reflections of the deterministic 
societal laws at the heart of the new paradigm? If society is made up  of humans, and 
humans have free will to act, how is the capacity for agency accounted for in a 
naturalistic ontology? Alexander (1982, p. 98) effectively articulates the problem: 
How [can] sociological theories which do accept the sui generis collective character 
of social arrangements ... retain a conception of individual freedom and voluntarism? 
From its inception, then, the upstart new science of society has  been 
aggravated with a great thorn of its own making. Devised to solve the problem of 
how there could be any social order in a society comprised of autonomous individuals 
(the Hobbesian and rational choice dilemma), the systemic solution created a yet 
more intractable problem, one best parsed by the circularity of Marx's (1978[18521) 
famous statement t ha t  "Men make their own history, but  they do not make it just a s  
they please ..." To date, the dilemma of how to reconcile the naturalistic logic of 
social science with human agency--that elusive escape art is t  which a s  Abrams (1980, 
p. 7) has wryly suggested "is not a new discovery, although from Hobbes onward, 
people have repeatedly unveiled it a s  solemnly a s  though it were1'--continues to 
provide grist for efforts at theoretical renewal in  social theory. Arguably, the various 
solutions, as much as  the original problem, have since left the social sciences 
fundamentally divided over the relative import of action and structure. 
In this discussion of the conundrum of action we join with and benefit 
immensely from the critical energies of many other approaches to social action (e.g. 
Abrams 1982; Alexander 1982, 1988a, 1989; Bourdieu 1977, 1990; Coleman 1990; 
Giddens 1977, 1985; Habermas 1979, 1984; Hawthorne 1976; Sewell 1986; Smith 
1987, 1990a, 1990b; White 1992b). Our approach, however, is premised on the 
assumption t h a t  we need to explore it as  a n  historical problem and deploy for the 
task a n  historical epistemology (Somers 1990, forthcoming b). The concept of a n  
historical epistemology is purposefully oxymoronic; it is intended to contradict the 
assumed foundationalism of epistemology and standards of knowledge. The term 
defines a way of carrying out social research based on the principle t ha t  all of our 
knowledge, our logics, our presuppositions, indeed our very reasoning practices, are 
indelibly, (even if obscurely) marked with the signature of time. They are "history- 
laden." l6 The challenge of a n  historical epistemology is neither to discover nor to 
invent the past. Rather it is to appropriate and interpret knowledge histories 
through a reconstruction of their making, resonance, and contestedness over time. l 
The goal of a n  historical epistemology is thus  to explore the process by which 
those problems which have such a formative place in  theory construction get 
identified as such--in time and over time. This means examining both the historical 
construction of presuppositional social science concepts a s  well a s  the internal logic of 
their categories and assumptions as  they unfolded historically. The goal is not 
primarily to understand "why" in sense of locating a sociological environment; it is 
more to understand how competing ontologies of identity, political life, society, and so 
on, gain currency and shape the empirical problems we encounter as sociologists. 
Much of what we in sociology treat  a s  abstract or presuppositional categories--subject 
and object, agent and structure for example--carry within them "frozen" historical 
arguments which have been abstracted into our familiar general categories. To 
"unfreeze" requires a n  "undoing" and t ha t  requires history. Taking a look at the 
historicity of apparently presuppositional categories of social thought also involves 
asking how the historical construction and transformations of a concept shaped and 
continues to shape its logical dimensions and its social meanings. Hacking (1990b, 
p. 359; 1984, p. 110) calls this level of conceptual analysis looking at "words in their 
sites." I t  is another approach to historicizing by locating conceptual problematics not 
only in  time, but  in conceptual space. Sites include "sentences, uttered or 
transcribed, always in a larger site of neighborhood, institution, authority, language" 
without which ideas would be just words, not concepts. Looking at the rise and fall 
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of moral and social concepts as words in their sites, and in  time, reveals their 
existence a s  historical--and thus  contingent. 
Thinking about the problems in a sociology of action through a n  historical 
epistemology leads to a different strategy for thinking about the ontological stalemate 
in the sociology of action--namely, t ha t  a theoretical resolution cannot proceed 
independently of a n  historical exploration. The metatheoretical attempt to resolve 
the conundrum of action flounders on the unexplored historicity of its central 
categories. We need to look at  the encoding of category by history. The theoretical 
task is thus a t  once a n  historical one: we cannot overcome the impasses of our 
theories without a new look at the histories they encode. But we cannot reread 
history without a new conceptual framework--at least tentative. Since each task 
requires the other, both must  proceed at once.18 
Classical Modernization as Metanarrative 
To illustrate: We have seen t ha t  the conceptual framework of modern social 
science has a built-in aporia between actors and society--an aporia in par t  born of 
the revolutionary epistemology described in the opening paragraph. But the aporias 
of agency and system are  not only a product of the logic of social science. Even more 
important, they rest on the core of  an historical "metanarrative" of classical western 
modernization embedded i n  th'e logic. Social theory is as much history and  narrative 
as  it is metatheory. In its very construction all theory presumes a prior question to 
which the theory is designed to be a n  answer (Gadamer 1989; Collingwood 1970)- 
hence the theory itself it is already a n  intervening moment in  a narrative process of 
knowledge construction. In the form of a n  "answer," social theory contains a 
historicity which can only be disclosed by discovering both the original historical 
problem it was designed to solve and the complex ways in which answer has  found its 
way into the core of our most presuppositional concepts. Modern social theory 
emerged as the answer to the  macro-sociological question by which our social science 
founders were possessed: namely, how to explain the emergence and the nature of the 
.. 
modern world and its epochal break from "traditional society? To answer this 
question, the classical founders constructed a social theory based upon a n  
appropriation of the historical and empirical world. Indeed the very power and 
durability of sociological thought can only be explained by the substantive and 
historical answers to which it lays claim. l9 
What  were the consequences of this inextricable entanglement between the 
new social scientific naturalism and the historical transformations of modernity? A 
most unique idea: If the nature of modern society could be conceived as organized 
according to the systemic laws of nature, the emergence of modernity could be 
explained by a self-generated, rational, and progressive logic shed of the constraints 
of ethics and law, political authority, religion, and kinship. New concepts were thus 
unleashed. The social world was now conceptually bifurcated between "tradition" 
and "modernity" driven by the relentless motor of technical rationality which had the 
power to remake society, institutions, social life, even the drama of human 
intentionality itself, in its own image. 
- -. . Nothing could have been more ironic and paradoxical. A master-narrative of 
--- modernity was produced through the lens of a self-consciously, indeed belligerently 
so. anti-historical, anti-narrative, naturalistic conceptual frame. The results are the 
strange hybrid we unconsciously live with today--a social science sprung from a 
utopian vision of escaping the pas t  (history) t h a t  is nonetheless constituted upon a 
metanarrative framework. Classical modernization theory--the macro-theoretical 
story aimed at describing and explaining the making of the modern western world, 
its structural and its social dynamics--was the outcome, indeed the great and lasting 
invention, of this complex fusion of history and theory. The foundational story 
deeply encoded within modern social science had all the formal components of 
analytic narrative--causal emplotment (the engine of industrialization), a beginning 
(traditional society), a middle (crisis of industrial revolution), and end (resolution 
into modernity), and leading protagonists in action (classes in struggle). The only 
thing missing, however, was conceptual narrativity. Its conceptual core--classes, 
society, social actors, social action--were devoid of ontological historicity. 
Temporality, spatiality, relationality, and concrete linkages all gave way to the 
utopian ideals of social abstractionism. And in this paradoxical combination can be 
found the source of many of the problems of social action. 
Modern social theory was thus crafted out of epic moments in  history. 
Plagues, wars, famines, and revolutions all play their parts; the Black Death, the 
English Civil War, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution 
all figure as shadows in the heart  of the metatheoretical and theoretical framework. 
Society, social action, the social actor, causality, and even social change are  each 
terms carrying within themselves pieces of the great metanarrative of modernity. 
But the stories and researches (Lieberson 1992) tha t  constitute some of our most 
important and significant theories are completely invisible; t ha t  is, they have been 
naturalized to the point where what is in fact a narrative--that is a constructed story- 
-becomes metatheory. The narratives t ha t  have so long constituted social theory are 
excluded from the very definition of theory and relegated to the realm of "just 
history." 
But the consequences are ironic. On the one hand, it is their very powers of 
abstraction which serve to privilege theories over "mere history." Who among us  has  
not been thoroughly convinced by the post-positivist argument t ha t  facts are "theory- 
laden," and t ha t  histories are  organized by theoretical categories? But, on the other 
hand, few among us  would "accuse" a theory of being "history-laden," t ha t  is, 
actually constructed on the basis of a story? The lowly status of history is evident in 
the scorn "empiricism" is met with. To the extent t ha t  empiricism suggests t h a t  
there is such a n  activity as the assemblage of raw facts, such derision is well- 
deserved. But the case we are  making is something different altogether: Not "raw 
facts" but  constructed stories sit in the core of virtually all of our social theories. 
We have arrived at one of the reasons for the enduring presence of the 
ontological impasse between actor and society in social theory; the terms are 
themselves creations of a particular historical narrative. I t  is their unexarnined and 
deeply problematic historicity t ha t  reproduces the dilemmas in  a sociology of action. 
If sociology's impasses are  in the original fusion of macro-historical analysis and 
epistemology, and if the concepts we use to describe the world are  historicized and 
limited, it follows logically t h a t  we must deconstruct the historicity of the concepts 
we use by means of a n  historical epistemology. The challenge this poses for a 
sociology of action is to develop ways of knowing, exploring, and explaining t ha t  can 
accommodate historically constituted concepts of human agency, institutions, 
cultures, and social identities. This historical dimension of theoretical practice is one 
which subjects claims of naturalism to the challenge of competing historical 
epistemologies. 
Historicizing Agency 
Recall the epistemological template for the problem of action as  expressed in 
Townsend's fantasia of the goats and the dogs on the isle of J u a n  Fernandez. This 
naturalistic epistemology was one moment of the general revolutionary Progressivism 
of eighteenth and nineteenth century science and politics in which societal laws of 
nature--rather t han  laws of the state--now explained the social world. But 
naturalism inevitably threatened to annihilate the subject. Faced with this 
dilemma, sociological theory did not bury a theory of action. Rather, it conjoined its 
new found naturalism with the ontological counterpart to social structural 
progressivism and created the "revolutionary idiom of actionw--the compulsion to 
individuate was at once both naturalistic and a n  historical creation of modernity. 
Recognizing and naming the revolutionary idiom at the heart of theories of agency 
are the first steps to understanding the problem the idom has left us  with. The next 
step is to deconstruct its historicity. 
Sociology's discovery of the social actor emerged from a convergence of 
mushrooms, reason, and revolution. In the first case, the Hobbesian abstraction 
("Let us  ... consider men...as if but  even now sprung out of the ear th  ... like 
mushrooms..without all kinds of engagement to each other") celebrated the 
emancipatory vision contained in the idea of the self-interested individual free to 
create hislher world anew.2o Second, the Kantian critique positing reason over the 
naturalism of Hobbes's ontology appealed to progressive minds and lodged the idea of 
the morally autonomous modern individual on firm grounds. Finally, the French 
Enlightenment sealed the amalgamation: Voltaire's, Diderot's, and Rousseau's free 
self was driven naturally to repel the force of political authority, tradition, custom, 
and institutional bonds--all in  the name of freedom from domination. 
But the appropriation of the conceptual agent from the philosophers by the  
social scientists involved a critical transmutation. They moved the foundations from 
a transcendental to a n  empirical and historical grounding because social science's 
individual actor could not, of course, remain a Hobbesian or Lockean pre-social being. 
Rather, the sociological innovation was to reconceive the social actor. as a 
devetopmental product of the modernizing process of progressive individuation. Only 
this way could a sociology of action dovetail with premises of classical modernization: 
The process of achieved individuation towards "freedom from ..." was enmeshed 
within the continuum of societal change--from traditional to modern society. 
Individuation itself could thus  be seen along a progressive continuum running from 
political andlor religious embeddedness to freedom. Authentic social action 
necessarily meant a facing away from all t h a t  "tradition" represented-the past, 
institutional relations, contingency. From the French Revolution, the triumph of 
political and economic Liberalism, and the German route to modernity, modern social 
science derived the lesson t ha t  the free modern self which comprised the actor of 
modern society had to be a n  autonomous self severed from the archaic ties of the pas t  
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and others. Action thus became authentic only when it was striving forward toward 
individuation and "freedom from.. ." 
Social science's modern actor was thus  conceived through a blending of 
philosophy with Newton. At a stroke, a philosophy of moral autonomy was 
refashioned to accommodate the progressive naturalism of modernization theory. 
This new revolutionary idiom of agency raised to a priori status a n  abstracted fiction 
of the social subject. Agency and social action became theoretically embedded in the 
historical fiction of the individuating social actor whose natural  state was moving 
toward freedom from the past and separation from symbolic association, "tradition," . 
and above all, the constraint of "others." Marx's celebration of bourgeois society as 
a necessary societal stage in the progression of freedom, Weber's autonomous 
individual as the only valid subject of action, and the early Durkheimys moral 
individual freed by the overturning of gemeinschaft all confirmed the sociological 
appropriation of this revolutionary idiom.21 They each built their theories on the 
duality of subject and object, the individual versus society. The identity of the 
subject was abstracted from history; social relations and institutional practices--even 
collective memory--would exist a s  external objects of power and constraint. 
Yet herein lies the explanation for why the revolutionary idiom of action 
generates a n  incoherent and unintelligible ontology. The sociology of action is rooted 
in the strange premise that somewhere and somehow between the social and 
historical production of agential beliefs, needs, even individuality itself on the one 
side (through modernization, socialization), and on the other, the reception of and 
acting upon these beliefs by a fully formed subject, the original process of social 
constitution is lost and the modern social actor becomes a fixed and universal self 
driven to maintain separation and autonomy from others. No longer ontologically 
natural  as in natural  rights theory, the sociological agent becomes a n  historicist 
product of modernization. The twist is t ha t  social science's discrete individuating 
actor becomes naturalized by virtue of becoming modernized. For sociological theory-- 
a theory of modernized society--what is modern becomes naturalized; hence 
presuppositional. 
From Freedom in Separation to Constraint by Others 
But here the sociology of action confronts a recurring problem. Even 
sociologists have not failed to note the inconsistency between the  postulates of the 
revolutionary idiom and the abundance of evidence which calls into question the 
assumption t ha t  modern social agency--in the absence of domination--is universally 
oriented toward and constituted by a naturalized state of individuation. Why, for 
example, do social agents sometimes act within "traditions?"22 Why do some people 
in some places seem to value "relationality" more t han  separation (Gilligan 1982) 
and others value autonomy considerably more t han  community? Why do so many 
social movements not try to overthrow the state bu t  work to persuade the state to 
meet its promised obligations (Somers 1986)? Why, more than  thirty years after the 
Civil Rights movement--a movement for universal rights-- are there discussions 
about whether blacks should be called African- Americans? Why the interest and 
controversy around proposals for a n  Afrocentric approach to knowledge (Asante 
1987)? Why do "moderns" "continue to infuse values, institutions, even mundane 
physical locations with the mystery and awe of the  sacred" (Alexander 1989, p. 246)? 
Why are people willing to die in  situations where there is minimal likelihood of 
achieving instrumental goals (Calhoun 1991c)? Why do some families consider 
neighborhood associations to be more valuable t han  cash (Stack 1974)? Why did 
(and do) working classes strike to preserve the honor of their skills and crafts (Reddy 
1987)? Why is social capital often more valuable t han  material capital (Bourdieu 
1984; Lamont 1992)? 
Faced with such questions there have been two logical choices for the social 
sciences: 1) to toss out the revolutionary idiom as a useless heuristic for explanation-- 
and by implication, call into question one of the  central postulates of sociology and 
its grounding i n  classical modernization theory, or 2) to preserve the revolutionary 
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idiom by looking outside of it for a n  explanation of anomalousness from its vision. I t  
is the second course t ha t  has characterized sociology's approach to the "meaning of 
meaning" (Putnam 1975). To preserve the pristine status of the revolutionary idiom, 
"deviant" behavior has been consistently explained by the power o f  the social order to 
determine social action over and above the naturalized state o f  individuation. For if 
social action appears to derive meaning in  ways t h a t  are incompatible with the 
revolutionary idiom of action--then only a phenomenon external to the modern actor 
can explain this incompatibility. Hence the entity of "societyw--the object in a 
subject-object duality--becomes the determinant of all constraining action (whether 
through economic forces, bureaucratic control, or internalized constraint and shared 
norms). The most common sociological understanding of the modern version of this 
constraint is "internalized norms" mediated through society's regulative institutions 
of law, religion, family, community, education, kinship, and social policy. More 
radically, (from Marx and Weber), constraint derives from the state itself, now 
conceived as  a dangerous residual of traditional forms of domination t ha t  has  been 
modernized through capitalist development and class formation (Marx) or through 
the rationalizing processes of bureaucratization (Weber). 
The Institutional Conundrum 
But here we confront the second great problem of social theory--the problem of 
institutions. The institutional problem exists ambiguously among the shadows of 
societal determinism. Since research on social institutions has  always figured 
prominently in the social sciences, until recently the problem has  not achieved the 
publicity of t ha t  of action (March and Olsen 1984; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). But 
surely it is as great a conundrum: We have seen how a sociology of action by 
necessity takes as its universal state a striving for "freedom from ...." And we have 
in turn  seen t ha t  in this context acting within the constraints of relationality can 
only be made intelligible through the notion of societal constraint. But if 
relationality is embedded in institutions external to the social agent, where do 
institutions come from? The problem is highlighted by recalling Townsend's fable 
and the narrative of modernization. Both displaced law, moral authority, and power 
to peripheral s tatus in a naturalistic societal paradigm. The consequences were t h a t  
the autonomous societal market would now rule the conceptual terrain where 
institutions and relationships had once prevailed. But, no less t han  t h a t  of agency, 
this produced a glaring enigma: On the one hand, power and institutions were 
reconceptualized as  epiphenomena of a naturalistic social system. Tha t  made 
institutions into functions of societal principles writ large--principles which were 
crystallized in  the individuation and analytic autonomy assumed to be characteristic 
of the modern social actor. But on the other hand, these very institutions were also 
to serve a s  the explanation for the sociological conception of relational constraint. 
How could power and institutions embody both the individuating principles of modern 
action and the expressions of modern relational constraint? 
This, then, is the problem arising from the awkward coexistence of 
naturalism, the revolutionary idiom, and sociology's conceptual confrontation with 
institutions. Faced with expressions of agency t ha t  cannot be located within a n  
analytic s ta te  of individuation, sociological logic must  rely on institutional 
domination to explain the deviancy. A dominating state, laws, bureaucracy, the 
power of ideology andlor social norms, become the mechanisms of explanation for the 
failure to account for relational social agency. The permutations on this theme can 
be staggering: tradition, social control, bureaucratic manipulation, institutional 
rationalization, false consciousness, norms, roles, and  values are  but  a few of the 
mechanisms assumed to be expressions of societal constraint. The t rue  
accomplishment, however, was the conceptual consolidation of what was to become 
the great agony of modern social theory. The modern agent--freed by modernity from 
traditional relationality to arrive at a condition of ontological autonomy--co-exists in  
sociology's theoretical universe alongside both the naturalism of a systemically 
conceived society and a simultaneous notion of domination and control from 
. . 
institutions and others. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, with different normative 
premises, each carried forth the dualism of the individuated actor against society.23 
Thus sociologists relentlessly push human agency into the reductionist cul de 
sac against which we so insistently rail. As long as the social actor is represented as 
the analytic individual, relational action challenging the postulates of the 
revolutionary idiom--action organized through patterns of community constraint, for 
example (whether defined as  private--family, church, tradition, or public--economy, 
state), cannot be considered authentic but  ra ther  a result of societal constraint or 
domination. No amount of willfully pushing and  prodding this revolutionary idiom of 
action will resolve the conundrum; the problem lies in history, not in will. 
11: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY: FROM UNIVERSALITY TO CATEGORY 
In recent years classical social theory ha s  been confronted with a set of 
extraordinary challenges--ones t ha t  have arisen i n  pa r t  from external political and 
social transformations and in  part  from theoretical attempts to make sense of those 
social developments. The political and social elements are best represented by such 
factors as  the "failure" of western working classes to carry out  their "proper" 
revolutionary (class) interests, the collapse of communist regimes, the radical 
increase of women in the workforce, and the resurgence of ethnic solidarities and 
cultural nationalisms throughout the world. Among the responses to these changes 
are  the vast array of "new social movements" t h a t  have arisen to prominence in the 
last  twenty years (Green parties, gay and lesbian liberation movements, and so on), 
the explosion of a feminist consciousness which valorizes female "difference" as much 
as equality, and the politics of multiculturalism.24 
Although they takes no universal form (Aronowitz 1992, p. 12) the various 
expressions of this  new "politics of identity" all share the common feature of being 
constituted by people who previously felt marginalized from dominant political 
channels and more mainstream social movements. Similarly, these are also groups 
and individuals who have been marginalized by our prevailing social theoretical 
accounts for why people act  the way do. Thus, for example, classical theoretical 
accounts of social movement organizations focus on class interests as a motivating 
factor for action andlor "instrumental" calculi to achieve specifically power-oriented 
goals. But rather than  emphasize traditional issues of labor and production, the new 
politics and movements of identity stress "expressive" goals of "self-realization" 
(Pizzorno 1979, 1985) while they attempt to positively restore previously devalued 
differences (e.g. female care-taking and "being-in-relations," Chodorow 1978; 
Elshtain 1981). 
To make sense of these striking developments, new theories of action and 
agency have emerged. These new theories of "identity-politics" have shifted 
explanations for action from "interests" and "norms" to identities and solidarities, 
from the notion of the universalistic social agent to particularistic categories of 
concrete persons. Based on the assumption t ha t  persons in  similar social categories 
and similar life-experiences (based on gender, color, generation, sexual orientation, 
and so on) will act on the grounds of common attributes, theories of identity-politics 
posit t ha t  "I act because of who I am", not because of a rational interest or set of 
learned values. 
Identity-politics are  relatively new on the agenda of social theory. But when 
viewed in  the context of the perduring conundrum of explaining social action, these 
new theories of identity are easily recognizable a s  confrontations with the same 
intractable problem of agency discussed above: How to formulate viable sociological 
accounts of moral action which do not resort to external constraint (or "internalized" 
external constraint) to explain action t ha t  "deviates" from the universalistic 
premises of those concepts t ha t  have shaped our theoretical discourses, especially the 
revolutionary idiom with its emphasis on a n  individuated ontology. The solution has  
been to challenge the putative universalism of the modernist ontology itself, for it is 
only when judged against this alleged norm tha t  women and other "others" have 
been found wanting. The new theoretical perspectives have argued, therefore, t h a t  
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the putative universal social actor is in fact extremely particularistic--namely, white, 
male, and western. Most important, they claim t h a t  it is only in the context of this 
theoretical sleight of hand, one which claims universality for the particularistic and 
androcentric, t ha t  the experiences of "others" are  suppressed, denied, and devalued 
in the first place. Thus the theoretical response has  been not only to reveal the 
gendered, racially, or class-specific character of the "general" modern social actor. I t  
has  also been to propose and envision a theoretical alternative t h a t  transforms those 
very devalued traits of (female or racial) "otherness" into a newly esteemed ideal of 
selfhood and normatized social action. 
Leading examples of such changes in feminist theory are  the well-known 
works of Nancy Chodorow (1979) and Carol Gilligan (1982). Gilligan began by 
confronting the fact t h a t  for years scholars of moral development had pondered the 
seemingly unanswerable question of why women did not achieve the highest stages of 
development allegedly achieved by men. Social scientists and psychologists alike kept 
asking: Why are women anomalous to the norm? More specifically, they wanted to 
know why women were getting "stuck" at a "lower stage" of moral development, 
while men developed a sense of agency and judgment according to the theoretical 
social norm--that is, they become increasingly autonomous, individuated, and 
oriented to rules of abstract justice. Women, by contrast, were believed to be at a 
lower stage because they were found to have a sense of agency still tied primarily to 
their social' relationships and to make political and  moral decisions based on context- 
specific principles based on these relationships rather than  on the grounds of their 
own autonomous judgments. 
Students of gender studies know well just how busy social scientists have been 
kept by their efforts to come up  with ever more sociological "alibis" for the question 
of why women &d not ac t  like men. Gilligan's response was to refuse the terms of 
the debate. She thus did not develop yet another explanation for why women are 
"deviant." Instead, she turned the question on its head by asking what was wrong 
with the theory--a theory whose central premises defines 50% of social beings a s  
"abnormal?" Gilligan translated this question into research by subjecting the 
abstraction of universal and discrete agency to the  concreteness of comparative 
research into female behavior evaluated on its own terms. The new research 
revealed women to be more "concrete" in their thinking and more attuned to 
"fairness" while men acted on "abstract reasoning" and "rules of justice." These 
research findings transformed female deviance and  "otherness" into variation and 
"differencew--but difference now freed from the normative devaluation previously 
accorded to it. In so doing, Gilligan contributed not only to a new recognition but  to 
a theoretical and  political celebration of the very female identity which prevailing 
theories had denigrated. 25 
Struggles over identity are thus being framed by the recognition t ha t  getting 
heard requires new theories. Scholars engaged in identity-politics, for example, are 
insisting that there are ways of knowing and defining experience t ha t  are  different 
from but equally valuable to those experiences of the dominant discourse. While law 
professor Catharine MacKinnon (1989) insists, for instance, t ha t  it is difficult for 
women to stage a revolution using the tools of the oppressor--especially his words, 
cultural analyst Molefi Kete Asante (1987, p. 165), implies the same when he asks: 
how can the oppressed become empowered if they use the same theories as the 
oppressors? In "The Search for a n  Afrocentric Method," moreover, Assante (1987) 
not only challenges assumptions about the universality of Eurocentric concepts, he 
simultaneously restores dignity to the very qualities of "otherness" by which such 
Eurocentric theories had previously defined and  devalued these same non-western 
identities. 
Such theoretical challenges are indeed welcome. They move away from 
deriving the meaning of action and the definition of self from falsely imputed 
universalities and toward generating concrete notions of social being which begin 
from difference. This can only improve the prospects for a sociology of agency. At 
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the same time, however, the virtually simultaneous outcries of "essentialism" 
directed towards these new identity-politics testify to a whole new set of stubborn 
conceptual difficulties. Among the many questions we must ask, for example, are 
whether the  new theories of identity-politics are not  creating their own new 
"totalizing fictions" in  which a single category of experience, say gender, will over- 
determine any number of cross-cutting other differences. Does this not run 
"roughshod" over women who might be "ill-served" by replacing all other forms of 
difference by the singular one of gender (Di Stefano 1990)? Feminists of color charge 
t h a t  feminist identity-theories focusing exclusively on gender oversimplify their 
situation since gender is just one of a number of other fundamental facets of identity 
and difference, such as poverty, class, ethnicity, race, sexual identity, and age (Hooks 
1984; Jordan 1981; Lorde 1984). 
Another question we must ask is how it is possible to claim social agency for 
these notions of identity if its putatively motivating force derives from "essential" 
( that  is, pre-political--e.g. "woman," "African-American") or "fixed" categories 
constructed from given attributes. If identities are  fixed there is no room to 
accommodate changing power relations or history itself as they are  constituted and 
reconstituted over time. One of the most influential of these criticisms has been t ha t  
directed by Joan Scott against the work of Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan (1982) 
discussed above. Scott (1988a) pointed out  t ha t  even with a well-deserved refutation 
of abstract universalism, Chodorow and Gilligan had only substituted their own 
ahistorical and essentialist notion of "woman." Why, asked Scott, should we assume 
t h a t  "women" will all ac t  the same under all conditions simply because of their 
biological sex or even their socialized gender-identities? Does t h a t  not open up the 
possibility for a female version of abstract universal agency and identity against 
which any number of historically different forms of female moral agency will be held 
newly "deviant?" 
There is also a question about the allegedly stable content of the new 
categories of identity. To assume tha t  simply because in some places and in some 
times women appear to be more morally "relational" than men in  their sense of 
agency does not in  any way support the more general conclusion t ha t  all women are 
more morally relational t han  men. Even if such a generalization could be 
demonstrated, however, do we really want to accept t ha t  these dichotomous concepts 
of gender distinction really reflect the social world? Is it not just a s  likely t ha t  the 
theoretical categories of exclusion helped constitute those gender differences in the 
first place? And if i t  is indeed the case tha t  female identities are  the consequence of 
categories based on false universality and exclusions, should we not criticize and 
contest these categorical identities rather than  applaud them simply for their "anti- 
masculinism"? In short, even assuming the empirical case to be true, is it not a 
serious mistake to leap from the empirical presence of relational identities to their 
normative valorization? There is too much evidence of the suffocating and negative 
effects of "being-in-relations" to accept this move uncritically. The underlying 
argument here is t h a t  a gender-centered identity-politics does not take on the real 
challenge of criticizing, contesting, transforming, indeed escaping from the 
theoretical dichotomies which buttress and hierarchicalize forms of difference in  the 
first place. Instead, the new identity-theories merely reify anew what is in  fact a 
multiplicity of historically-varying forms of what are less often unified and singular 
but  more often "fractured identities" (Haraway 1991). Thus while some scholars 
claim t h a t  establishing a n  identity or expressing self-realization is one of the goals of 
new social movements (Melucci 1989), there are others who consider the newly 
celebrated bu t  fixed categories of "identity" and "self-realization" to be the problem 
itself, regardless of the fact t ha t  they are newly informed by the traits of the 
previously excluded. 26 
Finally, and perhaps most worrisome, we must question the slide from the 
gendered distinction between a moral and normative notion of relationality (women 
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are  "relational," men are "self-interested") to a gendered distinction in the degree of 
analytic relationality between men and women. The latter is a n  impossible 
conclusion. Even if men can be shown to be less morally oriented towards 
relationships t han  women, this in itself is a result of the social and relational 
constitution of male identity. Tha t  is, both men and women must be conceived 
analytically as  being embedded within and constituted by relationships and 
relationality. Whether or not the analytic relationality characteristic of both men 
and women devolves into a gendered distinction in moral or normative relationality 
must not be presumed a priori but  can only be explored empirically and historically. 
These questions and concerns usefully highlight the theoretical dangers 
contained in the new theories of agency being called identity-theories. In the absence 
of clearly positive theoretical and epistemological alternatives to the problem of 
identity, however, such criticisms can have the effect of only tossing theories of social 
action and identity back and forth between the abstract universality of the modern 
individuating agent who starves in a vacuum of abstraction, and the essential 
"woman" (or black, or Serbian, or gay man) who drowns in a sea of relationality, 
"experience," and identity. A number of studies from different approaches have 
therefore begun the task of developing positive theoretical and epistemological 
alternatives to these two mutually reinforcing opposites (Scott 1988a, 199 1; Canning 
forthcoming; Poovey 1988; Minow 1990; Gagnier; Cohen and A r a b  1992 are but  a 
few.) Fraser and Nicholson (1990, p. 34) offer what seems to us to be one of the best 
summations of the challenge at hand. They suggest t ha t  alternative theories of 
agency--in this case feminist agency--should 
be inflected by temporality, the historically-specific institutional 
categories like the modern, restricted, male-headed, nuclear family 
taking precedence over ahistorical functionalist categories like 
reproduction and mothering. Where categories of the latter sort were 
eschewed altogether, they would be genealogized, t ha t  is, framed by 
historical narrative and rendered temporally and culturally specific. 
Joining the many others who are struggling to give substance to this directive, we 
propose linking the concepts of narrativity and identity to generate a different 
approach to theories of social action, agency, and identity. 
111: INTRODUCING NARRATIVITY 
We argued above t h a t  what we know today as social theory and its at tendant 
problems are the legacies of historicist fragments distilled into abstract ontological 
presuppositions about the modern actor. Recent challenges to these long-dominant 
presuppositions, however, have reified their own culturally and gender-specific 
identity stories and in the process created a new shade of universalism t h a t  contains 
its own historicist fragments, and its own inevitable exclusions. I t  would be a short 
leap to suggest simply that new stories need to be written, and perhaps old stories 
need to be recovered, in the effort to reconstruct a viable sociology of action. But 
different stories cannot merely be the product of one assertion against another. The 
classical story of modernity was constructed, like all narratives, through a particular 
epistemological filter conjoining eighteenth- and nineteenth-century -social naturalism 
with a revamped seventeenth-century ontology of the social agent.27 Both were 
epistemological escapes from all we associate with historicity--time, space, 
relationality. The paradoxical consequence is t ha t  the master-narrative of modernity 
at the heart  of social theory is conceptually both anti-narrative and ahistorical. If 
our new stories are  not to sound relentlessly like variations on the old, we need more 
than  historical deconstruction. In the task of rethinking theory and recognizing 
history we must  also reconstruct and rebuild a sociology of action constituted on 
conceptual narrativity. 
Reframing Narrativity 
The last two decades have been notable for the degree to which historians 
have debated and  increasingly scorned the value of narrative. But to understand 
why the new developments in  narrative studies by other disciplines could proceed 
quietly uninterrupted, it is important to remember what exactly it was t h a t  the 
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historians were rejecting. The conception of narrative t ha t  is common to historians 
is one t ha t  is treated a s  a mode of representation--discursive, rather than  
quantitative; non-explanatory, rather t han  conditionally propositional; and non- 
theoretical, rather than  one of the theoretically-driven social sciences.28 The conflict 
among historians was solely over how to evaluate t h a t  representational form.29 For 
"traditional" historians, narrative was seen as  ideal because the accurate 
representation of history was the essence of the historian's craft; for the social 
science historians, the traditional narrative representational form was inadequate 
because it neither explained nor interpreted the past.30 While the debate over 
representational narrative was raging-among historians, however, others were 
quietly appropriating the abandoned concept and using it to produce major 
conceptual breakthroughs in their fields.31 As stated above, however, the narrative 
- concept employed in  these new researches is radically different from the older 
-$ - 
interpretation of narrative as  simply a representational form. The new notion 
- 
recognizes narrative and narrativity to be concepts of social epistemology and social 
'-T-e , ..- ontology. These concepts posit t ha t  it is through narrativity t h a t  we come to know, 
.* -
understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and 
narrativity t ha t  we constitute our social identities. They argue, therefore, t ha t  it 
matters not whether we are  social scientists or subjects of historical research for all 
of us  come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by locating 
ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making.32 
From diverse sources33 it is possible to identify four features of a reframed 
narrativity particularly relevant for the social sciences: 1) relationality of parts, 2) 
causal emplotment, 3) selective appropriation, and 4) temporality, sequence, and 
place. Above all, narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) 
embedded in time and space, constituted b y  causal emplotment. Unlike the attempt to 
produce meaning by placing a n  event in a specAed category, narrativity precludes 
sense-making of a singular isolated phenomenon. Narrativity demands t h a t  we 
discern the meaning of any single event only in temporal and spatial relationship to 
other events. Indeed the chief characteristic of narrative is t ha t  i t  renders 
understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts  to a constructed 
configuration or a social network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of 
symbolic, institutional, and material practices.34 
The connectivity of parts is precisely why narrativity turns "events" into 
episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experienced in anything 
resembling chronological order. This is done through "emplotment." I t  is . 
emplotment tha t  gives significance to independent instances, not their chronological 
or categorical order. And i t  is emplotment which translates events into episodes. As 
a mode of explanation, causal emplotment is a n  accounting (however fantastic or 
implicit) of why a narrative has  the story line it does (Veyne 1984 [ 197 1 I); Ricoeur 
. 1981, 1984-86). Causal emplotment allows us to test a series of "plot hypotheses" 
against actual events, and then to examine how--and under what conditions--the 
events intersect with the hypothesized plot.35 Without emplotment, events or 
experiences could be categorized only according to a taxonomical scheme. 
Polkinghorne (1988, p. 21) implicitly addresses the difference between emplotment 
and categorization when he notes t ha t  social actions should not be viewed as a result 
of categorizing oneself ("I a m  40 years old; I should buy life insurance") but  should be 
seen as emerging in the context of a life-story with episodes ("I felt out  of breath last 
week, I really should start thinking about life insurance"). Similarly, it is also 
apparent t ha t  serious mental confusion or political emotion rarely stems from the 
inability to place a n  event or instance in the proper category. Rather we tend to 
become confused when it is impossible or illogical to integrate a n  event into a n  
intelligible plot (MacIntyre 1981). To make something understandable i n  the context 
of a narrative to give it historicity and relationality. This makes sense because when 
events are located in a temporal (however fleeting) and sequential plot we can then 
- 29 - 
. 
explain their relationship to other events. Plot can thus  be seen as  the logic or 
syntax of narrative (Ricoeur 1979; Veyne 1984 [ I  97 11; Polkinghorne 1988). 
The significance of emplotment for narrative understanding is often the most 
misunderstood aspect of narrativity. Without attention to emplotment, narrativity 
can be misperceived as a non-theoretical representation of events. Yet it is 
emplotment t h a t  permits us to distinguish between narrative on the one hand, and 
chronicles or annales (White 1987), on the other. In fact, it is emplotment that 
allows us  to construct a significant network or configuration of relationships. 
Another crucial element of narrativity is its evaluative criteria (Linde 1986; 
Polanyi 1985). Evaluation enables us to make qualitative and'lexical distinctions 
among the infinite variety of events, experiences, characters, institutional promises, 
and social factors t ha t  impinge on our lives. Charles Taylor (1989), for example, 
argues t ha t  the capacity to ac t  depends to a great extent on having a n  evaluative 
framework shaped by what he calls "hypergoods" (a set  of fundamental principles 
. - and values) (see also Calhoun 1991b). The same discriminatory principle is true of 
narrative: in the face of a potentially limitless array of social experiences deriving 
from social contact with events, institutions, and people, the evaluative capacity of 
emplotment demands and enables selective appropriation in constructing narratives 
(Somers 1986). A plot must  be thematic (Bruner 1986; Kermode 1984). The primacy 
of this narrative theme or competing themes determines how events are  processed 
and what criteria will be used to prioritize events and  render meaning to them. 
Themes such a s  "husband as breadwinner," "union solidarity," or "women must be 
independent above all" will selectively appropriate the  happenings of the social 
world, arrange them in some order, and normatively evaluate these arrangements.36 
Four Dimensions of Narrativity 
So far  we have presented the meaning of narrative in its most abstract 
dimensions. These relatively abstract concepts, however, can also be expressed as 
four different dimensions of narrative--ontological, public, conceptual, and "meta" 
narrativity. 
ONTOLOGICAL NARRATIVES. These a re  the stories t h a t  social actors use to 
make sense of--indeed, in  order to act in--their lives. Ontological narratives are used 
to define who we are; this in tu rn  is a precondition for knowing what to do.37 This 
"doing" will in  tu rn  produce new narratives and hence new actions; the relationship 
between narrative and ontology is processual and mutually constitutive. Both are 
conditions of the other; neither are a priori. Narrative location endows social actors 
with identities--however multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral, or conflicting they may be 
(hence the term narrative identity; Somers 1986). To have some sense of social being 
in the world requires t h a t  lives be more than  different series of isolated events or 
combined variables and attributes; ontological narratives thus  process events into 
episodes. People act, or do not act, in part  according to how they understand their 
place in  any number of given narratives--however fragmented, contradictory, or 
partial. Charles Taylor (1989, pp.51-52) puts it this way: "because we cannot but  
orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place relative to it ..., we must 
inescapably understand our lives in narrative form.. . "38 
But ontological narrativity, like the self, is neither a priori nor fixed. 
Ontological narratives make identity and the self something t h a t  one becomes 
(Nehamas 1985). Thus narrative embeds identities in time and spatial relationships. 
Ontological narratives affect activities, consciousness, and beliefs (Carr 1985, 1986) 
and are, i n  turn,  affected by them. Like all narratives, ontological narratives are 
structured by emplotment, relationality, connectivity, and selective appropriation. 
So basic to agency is ontological narrativity t h a t  if we want to explain--that is, to 
know, to make sense of, to account for, perhaps even to predict, anything about the 
practices of social and historical actors, their collective actions, their modes and 
meanings of institution- building and group-formations, and their apparent 
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incoherencies--we must  first recognize the place of ontological narratives in social 
life. 
But where do ontological narratives come from? How are people's stories 
constructed? Above all, ontological narratives are  social and interpersonal. 
Although psychologists are typically biased toward the individual sources of 
narrative, even they recognize the degree to which ontological narratives can only 
exist interpersonally in the course of social and structural interactions over time 
(Sarbin 1986; Personal Narratives Group 1989). To be sure, agents adjust stories to 
fit their own identities, and, conversely, they will tailor "reality" to fit their stories. 
But the interpersonal webs of relationality sustain and transform narratives over 
time. Charles Taylor (1989) calls these "webs of interlocution," others (MacIntyre 
198 1) call them "traditions," we call them "public narratives. " 
PUBLIC NARRATIVES. Public narratives are  those narratives attached to 
cultural and institutional formations larger t han  the single individual, to 
intersubjective networks or institutions, however local or grand, micro or macro-- 
stories about American social mobility, the "freeborn Englishman," the working-class 
hero, and so on. Public narratives range from the narratives of one's family, to those 
of the workplace (organizational myths), church, government, and nation.39 Like all 
narratives, these stories have drama, plot, explanation, and selective appropriation. 
Families, for example, selectively appropriate events to construct stories about their 
descent into poverty. The mainstream media arrange and connect events to create a 
"mainstream plot" about the origin of social disorders. The seventeenth-century 
church explains the theological reasons for a national famine. Government agencies 
tell us  "expert" stories about unemployment. Taylor (1989) emphasizes the 
centrality of public to ontological narrative when he states: 
We may sharply shift the balance in our definition of identity, 
dethrone the given, historical community as a pole of identity, and 
relate only to the community defined by adherence to the good (or the 
saved, or the true believers, or the wise). But this doesn't sever our 
dependence on webs of interlocution. I t  only changes the webs, and the 
nature of our dependence (p.39). 
CONCEPTUAL NARRATIVITY. These are the concepts and explanations t ha t  we 
construct as social researchers. Because neither social action nor institution-building 
is solely produced through ontological and public narratives, our concepts and 
explanations must  include the factors we call social forces--market patterns, 
institutional practices, organizational constraints. Herein lies the greatest challenge 
of analytic and  conceptual narrativity: to  devise a conceptual vocabulary t h a t  we can 
use to reconstruct and plot over time and space the ontological narratives and 
relationships of historical actors, the public and cultural narratives that inform their 
lives, and the crucial intersection of these narratives with the other relevant social 
forces.40 To date, few if any of our analytic categories are in themselves temporal 
and spatial. Rather, our modern sociological use of terms such a s  "society," the 
l ' a~tor , l l  and "culture" was for social science purposes intentionally abstracted from 
their historicity and relationality. The conceptual challenge t ha t  narrativity poses is 
to develop a social analytic vocabulary tha t  can accommodate the contention t ha t  
social life, social organizations, social action, and social identities are  narratively, 
t h a t  is, temporally and relationally constructed through both ontological and public 
narratives. 41 
M E T A N A R R A T ~ .  This fourth dimension of narrativity refers to the 
"master-narratives" in  which we are embedded a s  contemporary actors in  history and 
as social scientists (Jameson 1981; Lyotard 1984; Foucault 1972, 1973). Our 
sociological theories and concepts are encoded with aspects of these master- 
narratives--Progress, Decadence, Industrialization, Enlightenment, etc.--even though 
they usually operate at a presuppositional level of social science epistemology or 
beyond our awareness. These narratives can be the epic dramas of our time: 
Capitalism vs Communism, the Individual vs Society, BarbarismINature vs Civility. 
They may also be progressive narratives of teleological unfolding: Marxism and the 
triumph of Class Struggle, Liberalism and the triumph of Liberty, the Rise of 
Nationalism, or of Islam. The example of the master-narrative of 
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Industrialization/Modernization out of FeudalismPTraditional Society, is only one of 
many cases in which a metanarrative becomes lodged in the theoretical core of social 
theory. 
We have also pointed to what is perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of meta- 
narratives: their quality of denarrativization. Tha t  is, they are built on concepts and 
explanatory schemes ("social systems," "social entities," "social forces") t h a t  are in 
themselves abstractions. Although metanarratives have all the necessary 
components of narrativity--transformation, major plot lines and causal emplotment, 
characters and action--they nonetheless miss the crucial element of a conceptual 
narrativity. 
IV: THE CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW NARRATIVE 
So far, we have elaborated some of the dimensions of narrative analysis and 
have identified the major types of narrativity. What, then, are  the implications of 
this conception of narrative for social theory? How can narrativity help us  
understand social life and social practices? If narrative is indeed a constitutive 
feature of social life as we so claim, our first analytic challenge is to develop concepts 
t h a t  will allow us  to capture the  narrativity through which agency is negotiated, 
identities are constructed, and social action mediated, (White 1992b; Taylor 1989; 
Cohen 1985; Somers 1986, 1992). Although our four kinds of narrativity are  
relevant to social theory, it is the third t h a t  we consider the most important if 
theories a re  to adequately account for social action and collective projects. This is 
because conceptual narrativity is framed by temporality, spatiality, and emplotment 
as well as relationality and historicity. In the next section, we examine the two 
central components of conceptual narrativity: Narrative identity and relational 
setting. 
Narrative identity 
Recall the t rap  of the sociology of action. The mythic heroism of the social 
actor was canonized in a revolutionary idlom, a n  idea so potent it dissolved classical 
views of the mutual constitution of the subject and the social world. While the 
classical view believed autonomy to be conditional upon social and political 
embeddedness, the new idiom substituted the notion t ha t  the freedom of the self was 
conditional upon a n  antagonistic differentiation of the individual from hislher 
cultural and institutional webbing. Social relations and "traditions" became the 
"objectv--the domain of constraint--in a subject-object duality. Social connectiveness 
became part  of the external structure alone. I t  was the object in a subject-object, 
individual against society, antagonism from which the actor was impelled to be free. 
Theories of identity-politics are the most recent response to this theory of action that 
so frequently cannot account for deviations from its ideal-typical formulation. We 
have noted, however, t h a t  many difficulties arise when these new identity 
perspectives take those same "deviations" and move them onto newly rerevalorized 
ontological foundations. Thus, for example, the argument t ha t  women are  more 
attuned to "being-in-relations" than  to the (male) norm of individuation becomes the 
grounds for a new theory of fundamental analytic differences between men and 
women generalized from what is in fact a questionable normative affirmation of the  
moral relationality believed to be characteristic of female identities. 
The concept of a narrative identity dovetails with the move to reintroduce 
previously excluded subjects and suppressed subjectivities into theories of action. At 
the same time, however, the narrative identity approach firmly rejects the  tendencies 
of identity theories to normatize new categories t ha t  are  themselves a s  fixed and 
removed from history as their classical predecessors. The approach builds from the  
premise that narrativity and relationality are conditions of social being, social 
consciousness, social action, institutions, structures, even society itself--that is, the 
self and the purposes of self are constructed and reconstructed in the context of 
internal and external relations of time and place and power t h a t  are constantly in  
flux. Tha t  social identities are constituted through narrativity, social action is 
guided by narrativity, and social processes and interactions--both institutional and 
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interpersonal--are narratively mediated provides a way of understanding the 
recursive presence of particular identities t ha t  are, nonetheless, not universal. 
The importance of conceptual narrativity is therefore t ha t  it allows us to build 
upon the advances and simultaneously to transcend the fixity of the identity concept 
as it is often used in current approaches to social agency. Joining narrative to 
identity introduces time, space, and analytic relationality-each of which is excluded 
from the categorical or "essentialist" approach to identity. While a social identity or 
categorical approach presumes internally stable concepts, such t ha t  under normal 
conditions entities within t h a t  category will act  predictably, the narrative identity 
approach embeds the actor within relationships and stories t ha t  shift over time and 
space and thus precludes categorical stability in action. These temporally and 
spatially shifting configurations form the relational co-ordinates of ontological, 
public, and cultural narratives. I t  is within these temporal and multi-layered 
narratives t ha t  identities are  formed; hence narrative identity is processual and 
relational. In this sense, the narrative identity approach shares much with the 
relational epistemologies most associated with Harrison White ( 19 76, 1 992).42 
The analytic relationality of the narrative identity concept is thus at odds 
with the normative relationality of theories of identity-politics. Feminist identity- 
politics, for example, see relationality as  a normative ontology--that is, women are 
socialized to be more relational than men. This quality of "being-in-relations" in 
tu rn  makes women more "caring." In the narrative identity perspective, by contrast, 
relationality is used only analytically--that is, all identities (male and female) must 
be analyzed in the context of relational matrices because they do not "exist" outside 
of those matrices43 At the same time, this analytic relationality tells us nothing in 
'advance about the value or moral quality of those relationships and relational 
identities. The meaningful implications of a i-elationally-embedded concept of 
identity can only be determined by empirical inquiry, not by a priori assumptions. In 
other words, to say t ha t  identities are forged only in the context of ongoing 
relationships that  exist in time, space, and emplotment, is not to say that  "being-in- 
relationship" is somehow "better" or "worse" than the individuating notions of 
agency. I t  is, rather, to divest conceptual narrativity of any particular normative 
implications. The interdependence and connectivity of parts characteristic of 
narrative analysis makes relationality an analytic variable instead of an  ideal type or 
normative stand-in for an  unchanging sense of "community." Relationships may be 
more or less bonded, the experience of them may be more or less constricting or 
enabling--but again, this is a question of narrative contingency not utopian ideals 
(see Calhoun 1980 for a similar argument about .the use of "community" as a 
variable rather than an ideal type). 
This argument can be exemplified by class-formation theory. Class-formation 
theory explains action with the concept of interest. Since interest is determined by 
either the logic and stages of socioeconomic development or by universal rational 
preferences, the social analyst imputes a set of predefined interests or values to 
people as members of social categories (e.g., traditional artisans, modern factory 
worker, peasant). Historians commonly argue, for instance, that  the decline of 
traditional domestic modes of production and its (this decline's) concomitant threat to 
custom, created an "artisanal interest" from which explanations for social 
movements can a t  least in part be derived. Although social science historians almost 
always demonstrate with subtlety how these interests are mediated through 
intervening factors (culture, gender, religion, residential patterns, etc.), the interests 
remain the foundational explanation for working-class practices and protests. 
Making sense of social action thus becomes a n  exercise in placing people into the 
right social categories by identifying their putative interests, and then doing the 
empirical work of looking at variations among those interests (e.g.McNal1, Levine 
and Fantasia 1991; Wright 1985). 
But why should we assume that an individual or a collectivity has a 
particular set of interests simply because one aspect of their identity fits into one 
. 
social category? Why should we assume that  activist artisans (people who work in a 
particular way) should be defined above all by their "artisanal" interests simply 
because they are members of the "declining artisanal mode of production" category? 
To let "class" stand for a determinative experience is to presume that which has not 
been empirically demonstrated--namely that  identities are foundationally constituted 
by categorization in the division of labor. 
Substituting the concept of narrative identity for that  of interest circumvents 
this problem. A narrative identity approach to action assumes that  social action can 
only be intelligible if we recognize that people are guided to act by the relationships 
in which they are embedded and by the stories with which they identify--and rarely 
because of the interests we impute to them. Whereas interest focuses on how we as 
analysts categorize people's role in a division of labor, the narrative identity 
approach emphasizes how people characterize or locate themselves within a 
processual and sequential movement of life-episodes. Whereas an interest approach 
assumes people act on the basis of rational means-ends preferences or by 
internalizing a set of values, a narrative identity approach assumes people act in 
particular ways because to not do so would fundamentally violate their sense of 
being a t  that  particular time and place.44 In another time or place, however, or in 
the context of a different prevailing narrative, that  sense of being could be entirely 
different. What is most significant is that  narrative identities are constituted and 
reconstituted in time and over time--that is, through narrative processes. Calhoun 
(1991), demonstrates this in his narrative about how Chinese students, who had 
initially displayed no interest in politics, formed cohesive political identities during 
the one month they were thrust into the overpowering drama of Tiennanmen Square. 
The "narrative" dimension of identity there and elsewhere, thus presumes 
that  action can only be intelligible if we recognize the various ontological and public 
narratives in which actors plot or "find" themselves. Rather than by interests, 
narrative identities are constituted by a person's temporally and spatially-variable 
"place" in culturally constructed stories comprised of (breakable) rules, (variable) 
practices, binding (and unbinding) institutions, and the multiple plots of family, 
nation, or economic life. Most important, however, narratives are not incorporated 
into the self in any direct way; rather they are mediated through the enormous 
spectrum of social and political relations t ha t  constitute our social world. People's 
experiences as  workers, for example, were inextricably interconnected with the larger 
matrix of relations t ha t  shaped their lives--their regional location, the practical 
workings of the legal system, family patterns--as well a s  the particular stories (of 
honor, of ethnicity, of gender, of local community, of greed, etc.) used to account for 
the events happening to them.45 
I t  would be hard to find a more compelling illustration of the narrative 
identity concept than  in Steedman's (1987) widely-read sociological autobiography of 
her English working-class childhood in the 1950s. According to the dominant 
scholarly accounts (e.g. Hoggart 1959; Seabrook 1982), the extreme poverty of mid- 
century English working-class life was compensated by a robust "independence, 
pride, and sense of community." Sociologists have long assumed t ha t  social 
experience did in fact conform to this depiction of working-class identity. Steedman's 
narrative shatters all of our assumptions about the attributes of identity and agency 
t ha t  should normally fit with this form of social categorization. She presents us, 
instead, with a n  aching picture of the "class longings," and narratives of envy and 
desire ( that  life might be different), which characterized her life of underprivileged 
exclusion from the dominant culture. Steedman's representations of identities 
constructed of emotional and material poverty unfold sociologically in the context of 
the relational complexity in  which her life was embedded, and in the narratives she 
inherited from her mother's life--ones in which gender intersected with class and so 
utterly challenge the usual attributes attributed to both of those categorical 
id en ti tie^.^^ 
The narrative contingency of identity is similarly vividly suggested in 
Davis'( 199 1) historical sociology of the notorious "one-drop rule" in  racial 
classification. Davis' study demonstrates the numerous conflicts which accompanied 
a particular type of racial classification which failed to take into account the 
historical' intermingling of different races. By declaring t ha t  anyone with even a 
drop of African blood was a "Negro," the burden of proving one's identity--for blacks 
and whites--made it obvious t ha t  the category was too rigid to account for those lives 
which failed to conform to the dominant public accounts of racial purity and 
segregation. The irony was t ha t  the very people or groups who deliberately created 
racial classifications in the first place often could not even identify correctly those 
individuals they wanted to classify; obviously skin color was now a poor indicator of 
race. The impact of America's imaginative one drop rule, moreover, went beyond 
public and private struggles over personal identity. By compelling all children of 
mixed blood to live in  the black community, "the rule made possible the incredible 
myth among whites t ha t  miscegenation had not occurred, t ha t  the races had been 
kept pure in the south" (Davis 1991, p. 174). The issue of who gets to define a 
person is still not settled, i t  continues even today. One of the key decisions many 
principle investigators make about research projects concerning race is whether their 
interviewers should categorize the race of respondents or whether the persons being 
interviewed should get to choose their race from a preselected category. 
An important theoretical distinction needs to be made at this point between 
two kinds of classifications: Those based on (1) taxonomical categories of identity 
aggregated from variables (age, sex, education, etc.) or "fixed" entities (woman, man, 
black) and, (2) categories t ha t  coincide with a narrative thematic. For instance, it is 
not hard to classify certain narratives as  falling in the category of the "heroic 
Westerner," or "the virtues of American democracy." This is a classification, 
however, of the narrative itself: I t  can still be abstracted from context and its 
ontological meaning kept in tact. By contrast, the classification of a n  actor divorced 
from analytic relationality is neither ontologically intelligible nor meaningful. In her 
study of audience responses to western movies, for instance, Shively (1992) 
appropriately must  classify by theme the western movies she shows her audiences. 
Yet while these thematic classifications of the narratives remain stable throughout 
the study, her findings reveal t h a t  audience identification with and response to those 
themes depends less on the racial category of the respondent (native american or 
white) and more on the actors' changing social and historical embeddedness. 
Relational Setting 
Another challenge of conceptual narrativity is to develop a vocabulary that 
will allow us to locate actors'social narratives in  temporal and spatial configurations 
of relationships and cultural practices (institutions and discourses). We need 
concepts t ha t  will enable us to plot over time and space the ontological narratives of 
historical actors, the public and cultural narratives t h a t  inform their lives, as well 
as the relevant range of other social forces--from politics to demographics--that 
configure together to shape history and social action. We thus need a conceptual 
vocabulary t ha t  can relate narrative identity to t h a t  range of factors we call social 
forces--market patterns, institutional practices, organizational constraints, and so 
on. 
Society is tlie term tha t  usually performs this work of contextualization in  
social analysis. When we speak of understanding social action, we simultaneously 
speak of locating the actors in their "societal" context. But society a s  a concept is 
rooted in a falsely totalizing and naturalistic way of thinking about the world. As in 
Townsend's fable, for most practicing social science research, a society is a social 
entity. As a n  entity, i t  has a core essence--an essential set of social springs at the 
heart  of the mechanism. This essential core is in  tu rn  reflected in broader co-varying 
societal institutions t ha t  the system comprises. Thus, when sociologists speak of 
feudalism, for example, we mean at once "feudal society" as a whole, a particular set 
of "feudal class relations" at the core of this society, a "feudal manorial economy", 
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and a concomitant set of "feudal institutions" such as  feudal political units and 
feudal peasant communities. Most significantly for historical research, each 
institution within a society must co-vary with each other. Thus in  "feudal societies," 
the state by definition must  be a feudal state whose feudal character co-varies with 
all other feudal institutions; feudal workers must  all be unfree and extra- 
economically exploited peasants. And in "industrial society," a "modern 
industriaYcapitalist" s tate must be detached from civil society and the industrial 
economy, and industrial workers must  be individual and legally free. To be sure, the 
synchrony is not always perfect. In periods of transition from one society to another, 
there occurs a "lag effect" and remnants of the old order persist against the 
pressures of the new. But despite these qualifications, the systemic metaphor 
assumes t ha t  the parts  of society co-vary along with the whole as a corporate entity. 
To make social action intelligible and coherent, these systemic typologies must 
be broken apar t  and their parts  disaggregated and  reassembled on the basis of 
relational clusters. For a social order is neither a naturalistic system nor a 
plurality of individuals, bu t  rather a complex configuration of cultural and 
institutional relationships. If we want to be able to capture the narrativity of social 
life we need a way of thinking t h a t  can substitute relational imagery for a totalizing 
one. We thus concur with Michael Mann (1986, p. 2) who writes: "It may seem a n  
odd position for a sociologist to adopt; bu t  if I could, I would abolish the concept of 
'society' altogether".47 Substituting the metaphor of a relational setting for "society" 
makes this possible.48 A relational setting is a pattern of relationships among 
institutions, public narratives, and social practices. As such it is a relational 
matrix, similar to a social network.49 Identity-formation takes shape within these 
relational settings of contested bu t  patterned relations among narratives, 'people and 
institutions. 
One of the most important characteristics of a relational setting is t ha t  it has  
a history (MacIntyre 1981), and thus must  be explored over time and space. A 
relational setting is traced over time not by looking for indicators of social 
development, but  by empirically examining if and when relational interactions 
among narratives and institutions appear to have produced a decisively different 
outcome from previous ones. Social change, from this perspective, is viewed not as 
the evolution or revolution of one societal type to another, but  by shifting 
relationships among the institutional arrangements and cultural practices that  
comprise one or more social settings. 
Spatially, a relational setting must be conceived with a geometric rather than  
a mechanistic metaphor since it is composed of a matrix of institutions linked to each 
other in variable patterns contingent on the interaction of all points in the matrix.50 
A setting crosses "levels" of analysis and brings together in  one setting the effect of, 
say, the international market, the state's war-making policies, the local political 
conflicts among elites, and the community's demographic practices of a community-- 
each of which takes social, geographical, and symbolic narrative expression. This 
cross-cutting character of a relational setting assumes t ha t  the effect of any one level 
(for example, the labor market -sector) can only be discerned by assessing how it is 
affected interactively with other relevant dimensions (for example, gender and race). 
To do so requires t ha t  we first disaggregate the parts  of a setting from any presumed 
covarying whole and then reconfigure them in their temporal and geographic 
relationality. In this way, for example, different regions of a single nation-state are  
no longer cast a s  variants of a single society, bu t  as different relational settings t ha t  
can be compared. 51 
V: CONCEPTUAL NARRATIVITY AND THEORIES OF ACTION AND 
AGENCY 
Narrative Identity and Social Meaning 
A major advantage of the concept of narrative identity is in the challenge it 
poses to the false dichotomy too often posed between ideal versus instrumental 
meanings of action.52 One sociological claim is t h a t  action is only authentic when it 
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is expressive rather than instrumental. To enforce the point, material goals--such as 
bread and wages--are typically called instrumental while ideal activities are usually 
associated with qualitative concerns in daily life. Weber, for instance, argued that if 
wages were of secondary importance for German workers that  was evidence of the 
superiority of ideal action.53 From the same assumptions, neoclassical economists go 
to equal lengths to provide support for the primacy of self-interest among workers in 
order to support the concept of rational action. And most currently, it is theorists of 
the new identity-politics who distinguish the new social movements (from the old) by 
their putatively exclusively ideal--hence, identity--focus (Pizzorno 1979, 1985; 
Melucci 1 9 8 9 ) . ~ ~  
Yet from a narrative identity perspective there is nothing self-evident about 
the instrumental nature of wage demands any more than that  of the ideal nature 
usually attributed to cultural activities. Just  as an  adequate material life is an 
essential means of preserving normative relations, so cultural and symbolic relations 
provide material resources for livelihood (Stack 1976; Berg 1987; Polanyi 1977). 
Similarly, instrumental strategies and identity-politics appear to be increasingly 
linked in research findings about the new social movements (Touraine 1985; Cohen 
1985; Cohen and Arato 1992). 
Many examples defy attempts to periodize or categorize a transformation from 
instrumental (material) to ideal (identity) ends. Joyce (1987) has collected an array 
of studies illustrating the remarkable variation in "the historical meanings of work." 
I t  is not just that  work signified honor as much as livelihood; equally important, 
even when money wages were a t  stake, i t  was impossible to separate their value from 
that  of the "dignity of the trade" (see also Joyce 1991 ; Reddy 1987; Sonenscher 
1987). Many years ago Smelser (1959) demonstrated that  collective movements 
aimed a t  factory reform (surely the quintessential "instrumental" object) were 
motivated by working families' efforts to hold the "traditional" family together 
against the destabilizing impact of women and children's factory labor. And when 
nineteenth-century working people demanded the vote on the grounds of their 
"property in  labor," i t  was not the autonomous workmanship ideal of Locke on which 
they founded these claims, but  on the relational property of apprenticeship--a form of 
familial cohesion (Somers forthcoming a). 
The meaning imputed to the appropriation of material life should not , 
therefore, be presumed until historically explored. When we look at wage-struggles, 
for instance, a s  par t  of a n  a priori system of categorization, we inevitably classify 
them a s  expressions of instrumental goals. But when we view these same wage- 
struggles through the lens of a narrative identity analysis, we are immediately 
impressed by the difficulty of classifying them a s  solely either instrumental or ideal. 
Wages served every purpose from maintaining social honor, to preserving families, to 
asserting independence in the face of newly imposed factory regimes. Historical 
studies demonstrate the vast range of variation in the use of bread and wages. 
Indeed if there is any common narrative theme t ha t  emerges from these studies, it is 
t h a t  wage-struggles appear to be most commonly viewed as a form of provisioning--a 
characteristic social activity t ha t  defies either ideal or instrumental classification in 
its focus on maintaining relational continuities over time and within space.55 
The narrative identity concept allows us  to make this shift in  the 
interpretation of action from a n  a priori categorization to a focus on contingent 
narratives of meaning. The example of the conceptual shift from ideal versus 
instrumental agency to the concept of provisioning, for example, strikingly supports 
the switch from fixed notions of agency to relational analyses of identity formation. 
If persons a re  socially constituted over time, and space, and through relationality 
then others a re  constitutive, rather than  external, to identity; they are simply other 
subjects, rather than  external objects, in the social order. From this perspective 
authentic social action can readily encompass institutional practices t ha t  organize 
social inclusions and institutional exclusions--such as trade unions or community 
 association^.^^ Historical and contemporary studies indeed suggest t ha t  structural 
autonomy, and sometimes normative, was more o k n  than  not contingent upon the 
grids of social relationality (everything from collective memories, to political power 
and policies from above, to competing social claims, to pasts and futures of 
intractable social connections, and public narratives) t ha t  variably adhere to the 
interstices of a n  individual life.57 These institutional and symbolic relationships are 
no mere external set of norms to be "stripped away by the sociologist" to discover the 
"real processes analytic self' (MacIntyre 198 1, p.26); they are not "internalized" sets 
of societal rules residing within the human being. Rather they are  constitutive to 
I 
self, identity, and  agency. 
Consider the comments of one late eighteenth. century English artisan on some 
of the progressive French notions of liberty t h a t  threatened to dismantle regulative 
welfare policies: 
I t  cannot be said to be the liberty of a citizen, or of one who lives 
under the protection of any community; it is rather the liberty of a 
savage; therefore he who avails himself thereof, deserves not t ha t  
protection, the power of society affords (cited in  Thompson 1971). 
For this individual, others were not par t  of the external problem of constraint but 
constitutive--for good or for bad--of his narrative identity. 
Race, Gender, and Power 
Although we argue t ha t  social action is only intelligible through the 
construction, enactment, and appropriation of narratives, this does not mean tha t  
actions are free to fabricate narratives at will; rather, they must  "choose" from a 
repertoire of available representations and stories. Which kinds of narratives will 
socially predominate is contested politically and will depend in large part  on the 
distribution of power. This is why the kinds of narratives people use to make sense 
of their situation will always be a n  empirical rather than  a presuppositional 
question. I t  is essential, in other words, t ha t  we explicate, rather than  assume or 
take for granted, the narratives of groups and persons. The extent and nature of any 
given repertoire of narratives available for appropriation is always historically and 
culturally specific; the particular plots that give meanings to those narratives cannot 
be determined in advance. 
Since social actors do not freely construct their own private or public 
narratives, we can also expect to find that confusion, powerlessness, despair, 
victimization and even madness are some of the outcomes of an  inability or 
powerlessness to accommodate certain happenings within a range of available 
cultural, public, and institutional narratives. Thus in everyday talk we characterize 
the most incoherent.of experiences--and especially those where we feel controlled by a 
greater power than our own--as " ~ a f k a - e ~ ~ u e " . ~ ~  And i t  is for this reason that  
gender studies and critical race theory have so eagerly argued for the  importance of 
new public narratives and symbolic representations that  do not continue the long 
tradition of exclusion so characteristic of dominant ones. 
Patrizia Violi (1992), for example, reminds us how critical the presence or 
absence of particular narratives have been to the construction of both male and 
female subjectivity. The archetypical "universal" narrative allows men "to 
objectivize" themselves and their own experiences in these stories--stories that  not 
only represent maleness, but in effect replicate the metanarratives of classical social 
theory. In pointing out tha t  women do not have available to  them the same 
normatively valued forms of symbolic representation, Violi notes the difficulties 
women have constituting social identities. These representational silences are 
therefore tantamount to keeping invisible not only the differences between men and 
women but also the very subjectivities of women. Seeing representation, narrative 
and subjectivity as part of the same process, Violi (1992, p. 175) argues that  unless 
female subjectivity is made visible through narrative "it will remain confined within 
the closed space of individual experience." Choosing narratives to express multiple 
subjectivities is a deliberate way of rejecting the neutrality and objectivity 
appearance typically embedded in master narratives. Steedman's (1 987) analytic 
autobiography of her English working-class roots is perhaps the most powerful 
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example we have available to date of the power of alternative public narratives in 
counterihg the potential damage to identity-formation caused by singular dominant 
narratives. The public narratives of working-class community she had available a s  a 
child omitted women, just a s  many of the current feminist accounts of identity omit 
class and poverty (Collins 19'91). In this context of narrative silence toward her own 
experiences, Steedman presents a picture of a selfs (her mother) absolute longing 
and absence. Challenging the silence, Steedman articulates a counter-narrative--one 
which joins gender and class, with many other relational complexities of English life- 
-and thus she lays the groundwork for a newly reconstructed process of identity- 
formation. 
Struggles over narrations are thus struggles over identity. In a n  examination 
of their legal training, for instance, Patricia Williams ( 199 1) and Charles Lawrence 
(1992) explicitly reject silencing the human voice in  order to produce "abstract, 
mechanistic, professional, and rationalist" (Lawrence, p. 2286) legal discourse. 
Embracing the notion of multiple subjectivity, Williams tells us  t ha t  she does not use 
the "traditionally legal black-letter vocabulary," because she is "intentionally double- 
voiced and relational" (1991, p. 6) Lawrence (1992) calls this kind of multiple 
consciousness by another name--"dual subjectivity." Either way, these scholars or 
color contend t ha t  writing counter-narratives is a crucial strategy when one's 
identity is not expressed in the dominant public ones. Furthermore, it is not 
surprising t ha t  the narratives of excluded voices reveal "alternative values" since 
narratives "articulate social realities not seen by those who live at ease in a world of 
privilege" (Minow 1987, p. 10). The centrality of ontological narrative in the 
construction of social identities is also revealed in a story Williams tells about 
starting law school at Harvard University. With "secretive reassurance," Williams 
recalls, her mother explained why she knew the young black student would succeed 
at the prestigious university. "The Millers were lawyers, so you have it in your 
blood" (Williams, p. 216). Encoded in t ha t  story about the white slave holder 
.,' 
(Attorney Austin Miller) who had purchased and impregnated Williams' great-great- 
grandmother was the proof t ha t  a category is neither fixed nor non-relational. If 
"one drop" of blood could be a narrative constructed to define and dominate a 
particular segment of the nation's population, could the story not also be changed so 
t ha t  a single drop of blood is a symbol of status and thus a source of empowerment? 
Narrative Identity and Social Class 
Conceptual narrativity also allows us  to think differently about the 
relationship between social classes and social action. T. H. Marsha11 (1964), for 
example, in his classic study of citizenship correlated the stages of citizenship's 
development with epochs of class formation; each .stage represented the expression of 
the interests of a n  emerging historic class. Underpinning this argument is the 
assumption t ha t  actors within the same category ("the working-class" "the gentry," 
"capitalist employers," "state bureaucrats") will have shared attributes--hence 
shared interests directing them to have similar citizenship practices. Naturally this 
assumption leads us  to expect intra-class uniformity throughout each period of 
citizenship-formation: All the members of a single category of actors--the eighteenth- 
century English "working class," for example--should behave similarly and have the 
same capacities with respect to citizenship, regardless of other differences such as  
residence, family, or gender. 
But evidence shows otherwise. Even though eighteenth-century English 
working people certainly shared important attributes--they were propertyless in  most 
respects, exploited by their employers, and working for wages--their conditions and 
degrees of empowerment with respect to citizenship were not uniform bu t  varied 
dramatically across the social and geographical landscape. More important, the 
"same" working class differed radically as  to whether they even perceived the laws of 
citizenship to be rights in the first place (Somers 1991). Neither class nor status 
divisions could account for these differences since those in similar class situations 
maintained different degrees of power across regions. 
From the narrative identity perspective these same working-classes would be 
seen a s  members of political cultures whose symbolic and relational "places" in a 
matrix of narratives and relationships were better indicators of action than  their 
categorical classification. From this angle of relational membership, identities are 
not derived from attributes imputed from a stage of societal development (be it pre- 
industrial or modern), or by "experience" imputed from a social category (such as  
traditional artisan, factory laborer, or working-class wife), but  by actors' places in 
the multiple (often competing) symbolic and material narratives in  which they were 
embedded or with which they identified.59 We would thus no longer assume tha t  a 
group of people have any particular relationship to citizenship simply because one 
aspect of their identity fits into a single category known as the "working class". 
Social action loses its categorical stability, and group embeddedness and cultural 
representations become more important t han  class attributes--thus directing us to 
investigate citizenship-identities by looking at actors' places in their relational 
settings, or what Bourdieu (1977, 1985, 1986) would call a "habitus." As a general 
proposition, this would direct us  to expect greater contingencies of agency. We would 
be considerably less concerned with "deviation" and more fascinated by variation. 
This shift would in tu rn  allow us to make sense of a situation in which even 
though a large group of English people could be similarly categorized as "working- 
classw--in t ha t  they shared working-class attributes (lack of ownership of means of 
production, landlessness, and so on)--their political activities varied radically 
depending upon their settings.60 In the case of eighteenth-century England the 
effects usually attributed to proletarianization were in fact overdetermined in many 
instances by particular narrative relationships and institutional practices (including 
national apprenticeship laws, the participatory rules and expectations of 
enforcement, the durability of partible inheritance, the local control and symbolic 
meaning attached to skilled work, and the skilled practices of affiliation). In a 
context configured by these relationships, certain working communities were able to 
offset many of the "normal" consequences of propertylessness with a more powerful 
form of "property" in association and membership (Somers forthcoming a). 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued t h a t  both a n  epistemology and a metanarrative of modernity 
were embedded in the origins of modern social science--that of a naturalistic logic of 
society and a progressivist "revolutionary idiom" of the modern social actor. But the 
two co-existed uneasily. In  joining naturalism to ontological individuation, the social 
sciences had welded together a social agent firmly situated in a n  oppositional 
relationship to the intersubjective context of which it was a n  inextricable part. In 
the now naturalized condition of modern individuation, the social actor was thus 
constrained to enter into social relations with others. In philosophical terms, the 
subject-subject relationship t h a t  had prevailed in traditional political and moral 
philosophy was replaced by the subject-object one--the individual against society. 
We have pointed out  t h a t  as a result, much of the 'data of human activity has  
been inexplicable; by default, it has  been explained by recourse to various themes of 
social determinism. As a result, women, non-westerners, and minorities often are 
defined in social analysis as "irrational" or "anomalous." Consider the "problem" of 
those many nineteenth-century working-class movements, for example, t h a t  deviated 
from Marxist predictions of revolutionary class consciousness when they demanded 
state intervention to protect their rights. All too frequently, these movements have 
been labeled by historians and  sociologists as "reformist," or as victims of "social 
control" and "false consciousness." This barely conceals a hidden contempt for those 
putatively duped objects of history who acted differently than  would the putatively 
universal modern actor. Yet as long as we continue to conceptualize others as  
sources of external constraint--a position logically necessary to the individual/society 
dichotomy--we are forced to label such relational and institutionally-oriented goals as 
"backwards-looking," "reactionary," or as evidence of "social control."61 Action and  
agency t ha t  fail to conform to the postulates of the revolutionary idiom are  explained 
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by the external power of order, or internalized institutional constraint--be it norms or 
social laws, bureaucratic power, or economic forces. Why? Because the dispossessed 
ghost-like individual self is "less liberated than  disempowered" (Sandel 1982, p. 178). 
Indeed one could go further; such a person cannot--even heuristically--exist. 
This sociology of action thus  leads to a puzzling circularity: I t  strives to assert 
moral agency against the naturalistic logic of society, but  its criteria for authentic 
action negate the historical weightiness of analytic relationality and narrativity. By 
aspiring to capture a fiercely individuated notion of behavior all of the time, the 
revolutionary idiom does not achieve a n  historical intelligibility of action even some 
of the time. Its presuppositional claims have consistently been.unable to account for 
the constitution of agency through relationality. The consequences can be dizzying 
tautologies: Ontologically emptied of relationality, agency can only be explained by 
recourse to the external social order; deprived of substance, action can only be a 
response to collective constraint. Social theory has reproduced the very problem it 
set out  to solve--how to find a theory of action in  the shadow of a naturalistic 
- .. -- - .  
determinism. 
But reductionism is not the only problem t h a t  can result from social theories 
of action. When agency is explained through internalized social norms or 
externalized constraint, the meaning of action becomes historicist--a mere reflection 
of its immanence within the accordant level of the developing social order. In this 
kind of historicism characteristic of classical theories of the modernizing process, 
people are detached from historical continuity over time and space while they 
simultaneously are  made and remade by the restless momentum of changing social 
conditions. This hubris, too, fades under the glare of research. There is considerable 
evidence for the presence of certain existential themes--death, for example--in all 
expressions of identity--despite tremendous variation in strategies deployed to tame 
them.62 Thus historicism too must  give way to explanation t h a t  can accomplish 
what is the sine qua non of theory--the capacity to theoretically account for recursive 
patterns. In this project, tentative claims for circumscribed patterns of social 
arrangements and human action might be identified, but  to arrive at these safely we 
must immerse ourselves in  history as well as theory.63 If the aim of sociology is to 
generate explanation t h a t  is indeed meaningful, the capacity of its logic to lay the 
basis for achieving t ha t  end will depend on its epistemological principles and 
categories being informed by time, space, and n a r r a t i ~ i t ~ . ~ ~  
Bringing the rich dimensions of ontological narrativity to the new identity 
approaches in  social action theory is one way of doing this. I t  not only addresses the 
incoherencies of theories of action which leave vast numbers of social actors and 
social practices thoroughly unaccounted for--redefined a s  "marginal," "deviant," or 
"anomalous." I t  also builds upon the strengths of the recent shift in sociologies of 
action from universal notions of agency to more particularistic identities--a shift 
which endows the previously marginalized with a powerful new sense of subjectivity. 
In recognizing the importance of these new sociologies of identity, however, we 
have also tried to call attention to their considerable weaknesses--foremost among 
which are the conflation of analytic or structural relationality into normative values 
about "being-in-relations" (e.g. Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982), a s  well a s  the 
inadvertent ahistoricism tha t  results from constructing new categories of identity. To 
be sure, there is still a place for the use of categories of identity in everyday social 
practice.65 Brint (1992, p. 196), for example, rightly says t ha t  the sociological use of 
categories reflects the "belief t ha t  the experience of common conditions of life ... makes 
people with shared attributes a meaningful feature of the social ~ t r u c t u r e . " ~ ~  But it 
is precisely because this belief is accepted into social analysis too uncritically t ha t  
new theories of action centered around identity are often empirically confounded. 
Our argument is t ha t  there is no reason to assume a priori t ha t  people with similar 
attributes will share common experiences of social life, let alone be moved to common 
forms and meanings of social action, unless they share similar narrative identities 
and relational settings. Bringing narrativity to identity thus provides the conceptual 
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sinews t ha t  will allow us  to produce a tighter, more historically sensitive, coupling 
between social identity and agency. 
Finally, the concepts of narrative identity and relational setting allow us to 
reconceptualize the subject-object dynamic of modern social theory. This dichotomous 
dualism is transformed into numerous matrices of patterned relationships, social 
practices, and institutions mediated not by abstractions but by linkages of political 
power, social practices, and public narratives. This simultaneously reconceptualizes 
social agency away from its unitary status of individuation, and towards a n  
understanding of agency constituted within institutions, structures of power, cultural 
networks, and, more generally, those others who a re  a central analytic dimension 
(again, not necessarily normative) of t ha t  identity. In this view, institutions 
(however dominating or constraining) are wholly a product of collective practices 
rather than  of external entities. These conceptualizations are themselves premised 
on the extensive research, across time and space, which already suggests that  social 
identities are constituted by the intricate interweaving of history, narrativity, social 
knowledge, and relationality, as well a s  institutional and cultural practices. 
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NOTES 
1. Discussion of collective projects in the establishment of professional identity include 
Larson (1977) and Abbott (1988a). For the social sciences in particular, see Zald 
(1991), Collini, Winch, and Burrow (1983), Hacking (1990), and Ross (1991). 
2. Abell (1984, 1987), Abbott (1983, 1984, 1988b, 1990, 1992) have been in the vanguard 
of challenging this exclusion in the domain of methodology. Lloyd (1986) provides an 
excellent analysis of the development of these binary oppositions in the social 
sciences. A recent example of defining sociology by its opposition to "merely" writing 
history can be found in Kiser and Hechter (1991). 
3. The term comes from and is elaborated in Somers (1990, 1993b). 
4. On historians abandoning traditional notions of narrative or even standard notions of 
history per se, see e.g. Megill (1989, 1991), Novick (1988, 1991), Toews (1987), Eley 
(forthcoming), Stone (1979). 
5. See especially Ricouer (1979, 1981, 1984-86). In law and critical race theory see 
Williams (1991), Lawrence (1992), Geertz (1983), J. B. White (1984); R. Dworkin 
(1982); in psychology, see Hales (1985), Kemper (1984), Bruner (1986,1987), Sarbin 
(1986), Gergen and Gergen (1986); in medicine, see Williams (1984), Kleinman 
(1988); in psychoanalytic theory, see Spence (1982), Schafer (1981, 1983); in 
education, see Witherell and Noddings (1991); in philosophy, see MacIntyre (1981), 
C.Taylor (1989); in gender studies, see Violi (1992), Zerilli (1991), Bell and Yalom 
(1990), Miller (1991), Personal Narratives Group (1989), Maynes (1989), Gordon 
(1986), Graham, Hinds, Hobby, and Wilcox (1989); in anthropology, see Daniel 
(1984), Turner and Bruner (1986), Ortner (1991); in physics, Cartwright (1983); in 
biology, Gould (1988, 1990). 
6. This is beginning to change, e.g. Alexander (1989); Hart (1992), Sewell (1992), Somers 
(1992), Steinmetz (1992), White (199213). 
7. Harrison White (199213) has broken critical ground by bringing narrativity (stories) into 
the heart of his structural theory of social action, and see also Bearman (1991). 
Alexander (1988a, 1989) has also theorized the importance of narrative to social 
action. 
8. And despite their radically divergent evaluation of what counts as theory, the same 
conceptual polarities between narrative and causality are posited in the work of 
Abbott (1990, 1992) on the one hand, and Kiser and Hechter (199 1) on the other. 
9. This and the context of discovery were first formalized by Reichenbach (1947). 
10. In his introduction to the special section on "Narrative Analysis in Social Science," 
Sewell (1992, p. 479) stresses this point in observing the highly unusual "departure 
[of the topic] from the usual fare of Social Science History and from the vision of 
social-scientifically informed historical study that has dominated the SSHA since its 
founding a decade and a half ago." 
11. See especially Mauss (1985) and, more generally, Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 
(1985). 
12. Attention to identity-formation is slowly gaining ground in sociology. Significantly, the 
two major sources for these developments are both groups of "outsiders" from the 
discipline who are a t  once "marginal" to the theorized social actor: 1) women, people 
of color, ethnic minorities, and more recently, those who feel nationally excluded, see 
Collins (1990), Laslett (1992), Smith (1987, 1990a, 1990b), and Yeatman (1990) and 
2) the "new social movements" in Europe and America whose goals of "identity- 
expression" have been used to distinguish them from more "instrumental" 
movements, e.g. Aronowitz (1992); Calhoun (1991a, 1991b, 1991~) ;  Cohen (1985); 
Cohen and A r a b  (1992); Melucci (1989), Pizzorno (1985), Touraine (1985).. 
13. Chodorow (1978), Elshtain (1981), Gilligan (1982), McKinnon (1989), Smith (1987, 
1990a, 1990b), and Belensky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) are some 
examples of the reinterpretation of female "difference" into a form of gender identity. 
The criticism of categorical fixity is of course the animating impulse behind much of 
feminist, post-modernist, critical race theory, and the "new historicism." Canning 
(forthcoming), Chartier (1988), Collins (1990, 1992), Davis (1991), Flax (1990a, 
1990b), Fraser (1989), Haraway (1991); Laquer (1990), Lawrence (1992), Nicholson 
(1990), Scott (1988a, 198813, 1991), Smith (1987, 1990a, 1990b), Tavris (1992), and 
Williams (1988, 1991) are among the many contributions that have recently shown 
that racial and sexual categories cannot be conceived as pre-political and/or outside 
the bounds of social constitution. 
14. The next few paragraphs draw upon Somers (forthcoming b). 
15. On the myth, see William Townsend (1979[17861). The potency of the parable was not 
dependent on its lack of empirical validity. Malthus and Darwin were both inspired 
by its message--Condorcet passed it on to Malthus, and Malthus to Darwin. Yet both 
owed the success of their theories in large part to the impact on actual social policy 
that Townsend's anti-statist Dissertation enjoyed. His injunction that "legal 
constraint is attended with much trouble, violence and noise; creates ill will, and 
never can be productive of good and acceptable service: whereas hunger is not only 
peaceable, silent, unremitting pressure, but, [is] the most natural motive to industry 
and labor [and] lays lasting and sure foundations for good will and gratitude" 
spurred the repeal of the English Poor Laws which had long supported the poor in 
periods of unemployment. From this perspective, the true founder of modern social 
science was not Adam Smith who still argued for the moral role of political 
regulation, but this long forgotten figure of Townsend. See Polanyi (1944), especially 
Ch.7-10 for an important discussion of Townsend. On the discourse of "society", see 
Polanyi (1944, Ch. 10); Bossy (1982); Williams (1976, pp.243-47). 
16. This phrase is meant to evoke, but also to escape, the constricting binary, indeed almost 
Manichean, dichotomy between "theory-laden" versus "empiricist/positivist" 
conceptions of science and social science that frames the terms of controversy within 
most social science theory. 
This conceptualization shares much with Taylor's (1989) "episternic gain." See also 
Calhoun (1991b). 
See Somers (1986, forthcoming a) for attempts to carry this out. 
Lieberson (1992) makes a similar point about modern research. 
Hobbes (1966, p. 109). 
The early Durkheim could also be called here the Parsonian Durkheim since Parsons' 
reading was the most influential introduction and interpretation of his work. More 
recently Alexander (1988b) has reassessed Durkheim's contributions by focussing on 
the later writings. Among the most important findings of this reassessment is 
Durkheim's conclusive break with what we are calling the "revolutionary idiom" and 
the formulation of a critique of historicist readings of modernity that are among the 
most influential in today's cultural studies. 
Alexander (1989, p. 246) rightly states: "there seems to be abundant evidence that 
moderns still seek to undertand the contingency of everyday life in terms of narrative 
traditions whose simplicity and resistance to change makes them hard to distinguish 
from myths." 
For interesting secondary discussions that bear on this point see Dumont (1977, 1982)' 
Benhabib (1981), Giddens (1977). 
For discussion of the new identity-politics in theories of social movements, see footnote 
#12. 
See also Elshtain (1981)' McKinnon (1989) and Ruddick (1989) for extremely 
influential versions of feminist identity politics. 
These criticisms of identity-theories are articulated in many different ways and places. 
Some of the most useful include Flax (1990a, 1990b), Fraser and Nicholson (1990)' 
Haraway (1991), Lemert (1992), Scott (1988a). 
Polanyi (1944) still presents us with the deepest understanding of the discovery of 
society. See also Collini, Winch, and Burrow (1983) and Block and Somers (1984)' 
Durnont (1982), Carrithers et. al. (1985). 
This view of narrative as methodology was importantly substantiated by the 
philosophers and historiographers. White (1981, 1984, 1987) and Mink (1966, 1978) 
both argued that despite the representational value of narrative, it had to be seen a s  
a superimposed form that analysts/historians placed over the chaos of "reality" to 
organize it into coherency. See also Danto (1985) for a complex philosophical 
discussion of the analytic place of narrative in historical analysis. The major 
exception to this position, and a major influence on the new narrative approach, is 
Ricoeur (1979, 1981, 1984-86). 
For a sampling of the raging debate among philosophers of history in the 1940s 
through 1960s over these issues, see Hempel (1959 [19421, 1965), Dray (1957), 
Gallie (1968), Atkinson (1978), and Gardiner (1952). 
Hempel (1959 [19421) of course initiated a major challenge to this in his theories of 
scientific narrative. 
See note #5 above. 
Cf. especially the "life stories" scholarship of Bertaux (1981), Bertaux and Kohli 
(1984), Freeman (1984); Linde (1986), Polanyi (1985). 
This discussion of narrative draws from Somers (1992). For a range of discussions of 
narrative theory, see Scholes and Kellogg (1966); Genette (1980); Mitchell (1981); 
Jameson (198 1); Brooks (1984); Barthes (1974 [19661). 
We are happy with Friedland and Alford's (1991, p. 243) definition of an institution as: 
"simultaneously material and ideal, systems of signs and symbols, rational and 
transrational ... supraorganizational patterns of human activity by which individuals 
and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and organize time 
and space ...[ tlhey are also symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, and thereby 
rendering experience of time and space meaningful." 
This is indeed a different approach to the concept of explanation that the strictest of 
analytic philosophers of science would accept--causality as  a deductive instance of a 
generalization. Indeed the very strength and utility of the latter is its valid 
"denarrativization" or abstraction of instances, elements, or events from time and 
space into categories. See Somers (forthcoming b). 
36. For an especially useful empirical application, see Alexander (1989) for the impressive 
array of narratives that were deployed to explain action on both sides during the 
Watergate hearings. 
37. This is not to endorse the hermeneutic claim that the actor's intentions or self- 
understanding is a sumcient condition for a sociological explanation of action. We 
argue only that analyses of actors' own self-stories are a necessary condition. 
38. Samples of different approaches to ontological narratives can be found in Sarbin (1986), 
MacIntyre (1981), C.Taylor (1989), Bruner (1987), Bell and Yalom (1990), Bertaux 
and Kohli (1984), Crites (1986), Ferccero (1986), Freeman (1984), Gergen (1973, 
1977, 1985), Gergen and Gergen (1986), Didion (1992), Swift (1983). 
39. Organizational theory is one area of the social sciences that has used the narrative 
concept in particularly creative ways. Cf. DiMaggio (1988), Martin, Feldman, Hatch, 
and Sim (1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Meyer and Scott (1983), Mitroff and 
Killman (1975), Smircich (1983), Zucker (199 1). 
40. On narrative methodology in sociology and history, see footnote #2, cf. Abell (1984, 
1987), Abbott (1990, 1992), Brown (1987, 1990), Isaac and Griffin (1989), Griffin 
(199 1)' Quadagno and Knapp (1992), Reed (1989), Sewell (forthcoming), Somers 
(1990, forthcoming b). 
41. We are faced with an even greater problem in thinking about explanatory sociological 
narrative. Indeed in light of their status as  the epistemological "other", constructing 
narratives would seem to be precisely what we a s  social scientists do not want to do. 
Should we not focus exclusively on explanation? As we argued above in the general 
discussion of narrativity, the presumed incompatibility between narrative and 
explanation may well be specious. Of course this raises the question of what counts 
as  an explanation; there are, after all, competing positions on the validity capacity of 
different modes of justification. Rather than argue the nature of and case for 
explanatory narrativity which has been done elsewhere and a t  some length, e.g. 
Abbott (1990, 1992), Abe11 (1984, 1987), Aminzade (1992), Quadagno and Quadagno 
(1992), Somers (1990, 1992), let us make the argument that when we say that 
sociological explanations entail analytic narrativity that is not the same as arguing 
that social science theory is solely narrative. As Alexander (1991, p. 149) recently 
argued, it is also a code (Bernstein 1971). Even more important, to argue the case 
for explanatory narrativity is not to argue that there is no qualitative difference 
between a t  least the norms of analytic narrativity, on the one hand, and those of 
cultural and ontological narrativity, on the other. The latter attain meaning through 
internal integrity alone, that is, they are only partially subjected to external truth 
criteria. But as  Alexander (1991, p. 149) has also reminded us, "science differs from 
other narratives because it commits the success of its story to the criterion of truth. 
For every scientific narrative we are compelled to ask, 'Do we know whether it is 
true?" The strength of explanatory narrativity, however, is that it steps out of the 
typically "eitherlor version of "truth" versus "relativism1' and uses criteria for 
validity that are outside the extremes of "localism" versus foundational truth. 
Narrative explanatory analysis, from this perspective, guides us to construct and to 
believe in "the best possible account" a t  the same time that we know full well that (1) 
what counts as  "best" is itself historical and (2) that these criteria will change and 
change again. See Longino (1990), MacIntyre (1973, 1980), Nehamas (1985), and 
Taylor (1991). 
42. Thus it is not a t  all surprising that in his recent book, White (1992) has made stories 
and identity central aspects of his theory of social action. A useful summary of the 
structural approach is offered by Wellman and Berkowitz (1988, p. 15): 
"...mainstream sociologists have tended to think in terms of categories of social actors 
who share similar characteristics: "women," "the elderly," "blue-colar workers," 
"emerging nations," and so on... this kind of approach has its uses, but it has misled 
many sociologists into studying the attributes of aggregated sets of individuals rather 
than the structural nature of social systems." 
43. Even an isolated "hermit" is a social actor and must thus be made intelligible through a 
relational and narrative approach. 
44. Calhoun (1991) gives an example of how identity-politics moved Chinese students in 
Tienanmen Square to take risks with their lives that cannot be accounted for in 
rational or value terms. 
Fantasia's (1988) study of varying cultures of solidarity is one of the best examples of 
the empirical power of the narrative identity approach over the interest-based one. 
All of Steedman's writings (1987, 1988, 1990, 1992) could be seen as  elaborations on 
the theme of narrative identity. 
See also Tilly (1984) for the first of his famous "eight pernicious postulates." 
See also Bourdieu (1985) on social space and the genesis of groups. 
On the epistemological significance of networks and relational analysis over categories 
in understanding social structures see White, Boorman, and Breiger (1976, 1992)); 
for applications in historical sociology see Gould (1991), Mann (1986) and Bearman 
(1993). 
The epistemological implications of recent work in historical geography have been little 
noted by sociologists. Exceptions include Aminzade (1992), Giddens (1985), Mann 
(1986), Tilly (1984). 
An important view of the value of theoretically disaggregating social reality can be 
found in Bell (1976) and Walzer (1982). 
See e.g. Pizzorno (1978, 1985), Melucci (1989). 
See Alexander (1983a). 
Cohen and Arato (1992) challenge this point effectively. 
On the concept of provisioning, see Sahlins (1976). And for the importance of 
provisioning for gender analysis see Fraser and Gordon (1992). 
See Parkin (1979) for a sociological elaboration of this basic Weberian and 
anthropological notion. 
See e.g. Stack (1974)' Vincent (1981)' Tilly, Scott, and Cohen (1976). 
Ortner calls this "rupturing of narrativity" in her analysis of Eliot Liebow's Tally's 
Corner where she gives a example of how power relations have ruptured the 
narrative identities--and thus "normal future-oriented" behavior--of urban African- 
American men (Ortner 1991). See also Haraway (1991) and Lemert (1992) on 
"fractured identities." 
This is of'course only an analytic distinction; no narrative can be purely one without the 
other. 
This is a situation described in detail in Somers (1986, 1991). This of course fits much 
more with Weber's understanding of class as  objective market chances divorced from 
values. 
See F.M.L. Thompson (1981) and Reid (1978) for a sense of how pervasive the social 
control thesis was in social history during the 1970s. 
For examples see Bell (1980)' Laquer (1981))' Needham (1978)' Beidelman (1980)' 
Burguiere (1982)' Bloch and Parry (1982). 
See Alexander (1989) on the importance of the sociological classics and the limits to 
historicism. 
Scott (1988a) has made this argument most convincingly for the discipline of history. 
The question of the epistemological place of categories in the context of an overall 
relational and narrative approach is a major theme of White (1992b). Calhoun 
(1991a) discusses categories and relationships by bringing White's "structural 
equivalence" and "indirect relationships" to the study of nationalism and identity. 
66. And see White's (1992a) response to this criticism of what Brint sees as  an overly 
relational approach to sociology. 
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